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I. INTRODUCTION'

The fifty years since the end of the Second World War
have seen a proliferation of human rights standards at the
international and regional levels. The United Nations has been
the primary forum for the elaboration of many of those standards and there now exists an extensive corpus of international standards providing formal protection for a wide range of
human rights. Yet the challenge of human rights lies ultimately in ensuring the actual enjoyment of those rights,
though the setting of standards is important and necessary to
achieve this goal. The need for effective implementation procedures has led to the establishment, within the U.N. system, of
a wide range of bodies, procedures, and mechanisms intended
to enhance the enjoyment of human rights at the national level
by those to whom these rights are guaranteed. The develop-

1. This article is based on Andrew Byrnes and Jane Connors, The Adoption
of a Petition Procedure under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 1994) (Background Paper prepared
for the Expert Group Meeting on the Adoption of an Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
organized by the Women in the Law Project, International Human Rights Law
Group and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights, University of Limburg,
Maastricht, Netherlands, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
We would like to thank Donna Sullivan and Cees Flinterman for their comments
on a draft of the original paper (which has been extensively revised following the
Maastricht meeting) and to our fellow participants in that meeting. We would like
to acknowledge the important role played by the International Human Rights Law
Group, and especially of Donna Sullivan, Director of its Women in the Law Project, in the campaign for the adoption of an optional protocol to the Women's Convention. We also acknowledge our considerable indebtedness to the work of Philip
Alston and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the development of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, in particular Towards an
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Analytical Paper Adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at its Seventh Session, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 2, Annex
IV, at 87, U.N. Doc. E11993/22, E/C.12/1992/2 (1992) [hereinafter ESCRC Analytical
Paper].
We would like to dedicate this article to Arvonne Fraser on the occasion of
her 70th birthday. As a founder and first Director of the International Women's
Rights Action Watch, she has inspired many (including us) in the struggle to ensure women's human rights through the Women's Convention.
The research on which this article is based was supported in part by grants
from the Committee on Research and Conference Grants of the University of Hong
Kong and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council.

1996]

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

683

ment of these implementation mechanisms has taken place
very much in the last 25 years with a burst of activity since
the early 1980s.2
There is now a wide variety of enforcement mechanisms
within the U.N. human rights system. The so-called Charterbased mechanisms include the Resolution 1503 procedure,
thematic working groups and special rapporteurs, country and
situation rapporteurs, and the public debates of the responsible
human rights organs. The so-called treaty-based procedures,
established under the major U.N. human rights treaties, include reporting procedures, individual complaint procedures,
interstate complaints procedures, and inquiry procedures.
This pattern of elaboration of standards followed by an
emphasis on the development of effective international implementation mechanisms has been evident both in the general
human rights field and in those areas of the U.N. human
rights system concerned primarily with matters relating to the
status of women. However, the developments in these two
areas have taken different tracks. As is well-known, standardsetting and the development of implementation mechanisms
with regard to the human rights of women have evolved in a
separate sphere to other developments with respect to "human
rights." One of the results of this separation has been that the
mechanisms which have been developed for the enforcement of
"women-specific" human rights standards have been less effective than those developed for more general "human rights"
standards. The implementation procedures provided for under
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the Convention or the Women's Convention)3 are limited, and the communications mechanism of the

2.

See generally PHILIP ALSTON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A

CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1992) [hereinafter A CRITICAL APPRAISAL]; Nigel Rodley, ToWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE AND INTEGRATED

SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTEC-

TION BY THE UNITED NATIONS, World Conf. on Hum. Rts. Preparatory Comm., 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 3, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157PC/60/Add.6 (1993). For the
relevance of U.N. mechanisms to the enforcement of the human rights of women,
see Andrew Byrnes, Towards More Effective Enforcement of Women's Human
Rights Through the Use of International Human Rights Procedures, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 189 (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN]; Rebecca J. Cook, Women,
in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 433 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner

eds., 1994).
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
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Commission on the Status of Women (the Commission) is little

4
known and of little effect.
In recent years, calls have been made, particularly from
within the non-governmental organization (NGO) community,
to strengthen the mechanisms which currently exist for the
protection and enforcement of the human rights of women. One
of the demands made is that the Women's Convention be
strengthened by the addition of a complaints mechanism, in
the form of an optional protocol, which would allow individual
women to bring complaints before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW or the Committee), alleging that their countries had failed to carry out
their obligations under the Convention. Advocates claim that
not only would the addition of such a procedure place the Convention and CEDAW on an equal footing with other U.N. human rights treaties and treaty bodies, but also that a complaints procedure would ensure more effective implementation
of the rights guaranteed in the Convention.
Moves to elaborate a complaints procedure for the Convention have gained considerable momentum over the last few
years and the eventual adoption of an optional protocol incorporating such a procedure seems likely. In this article, we
examine the background to demands for such an optional protocol and its desirability and feasibility. We consider the major
legal issues that might arise in the elaboration of such a protocol and the form it might take. We also review current proposals for such a protocol.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Discussion of a Complaints Procedure During the Drafting
of the Convention
During the drafting of the Convention, there was little
discussion of whether it should provide for a procedure under
which individuals or States Parties could lodge with the body

Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's Convention].
4. Monitoring the Implementation of the Nairobi Forvard-Looking Strategies
for the Advancement of Women: Measures to Publicize the Communications Mecha.
nism of the Commission on the Status of Women, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1994/8 (1994).
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responsible for monitoring implementation of the Convention
complaints alleging violations of the Convention by a State
Party. This lack of discussion was due partly to the fact that
there was considerable debate over the appropriate monitoring
procedure and the body that should perform this task.5 These
issues were not finally resolved until the matter was voted on
by the General Assembly.'
In the early stages of the preparation of the Convention, a
number of states had suggested that consideration be given to
the adoption of both individual complaint and interstate complaint procedures.' Despite these suggestions, no draft of an
individual complaint procedure was put forward at any stage
of the consideration of the draft Convention, and it was only in
the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 1979 that a
draft interstate procedure was proposed. This draft was eventually adopted as article 29 of the Convention.8
5. See generally LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRAPARAToIRES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 187-203 (Int'l Studies in Hum. Rts. Series Vol.
29, 1993); Kiku Fukuda, Article 17: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 307, 307-16 (Japanese Ass'n of
Int'l Women's Rts. ed., 1995) [hereinafter JAPANESE COMMENTARY]; Noreen Burrows, The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 32 NETH. INV'L L. REV. 419, 452-58 (1985); Margaret E. Galey,
International Enforcement of Women's Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 463, 480-81 (1984).
6. In the draft of the Convention which it forwarded to the General Assembly in 1976, the Commission on the Status of Women had proposed that States
Parties to the Convention should submit reports every two years to the SecretaryGeneral. These reports would be considered by an ad hoc Group established by
the Commission on the Status of Women. The Group would consist of ten to fifteen persons who would serve in their personal capacity and would be elected by
the Commission from nominees of States Parties (including both States Parties
which were and those which were not members of the Commission). Commission
on the Status of Women: Report on the Twenty-Sixth and Resumed Twenty-Sixth
Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 3, Art. 19(2), at 10-11, U.N. Doc.
E5909, E/CN.6/608 (1976). The matter was further considered in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. It put forward three proposals for consideration
by the plenary assembly: the original proposal put forward by the Commission, an
Ecuadorian proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc group under the Economic
and Social Council, and a Swedish proposal (which was adopted and became article 17 of the Convention). Galey, supra note 5, at 480-81.
7. Considerationof Proposals Concerning a New Instrument or Instruments of
International Law to Eliminate DiscriminationAgainst Women: Working Paper by
the Secretary-General, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 25th Sess., Agenda Item
100-107, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/573 (1973) (Sweden and Canada specifically
4(b),
proposed an individual complaints procedure).
8. Abe Kouki, Article 29: Settlement of Disputes, in JAPANESE COMMENTARY,
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The discussion of implementation and enforcement measures for the Convention concerned three main issues:
1) whether any form of monitoring procedure was necessary
or desirable, or whether the Commission on the Status of
Women as part of its overall activities could supervise the
general implementation of the Convention;
2) if a monitoring procedure was desirable, whether a reporting system was the appropriate method and whether this
should be supplemented by other procedures; and
3) the body to which reports under the Convention should be
submitted, the main options being the Commission on the
Status of Women, an ad hoc group of the Commission, or a
body of independent experts established for the purpose of
reviewing States Parties' reports.

The Commission proposed the establishment of an ad hoc
group to consider reports submitted by States Parties. What
emerged from consideration of the matter in the General Assembly was article 17 of the Convention, which provides for
the establishment of a body of independent experts which
would perform the function of reviewing States Parties' reports. This procedure drew heavily on the existing arrangements under the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination' (Racial Discrimination
Convention) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' ° (ICCPR).
Although it did not loom large in the discussions of the
draft Convention, the question of a complaints procedure was
raised during the Commission's deliberations. Following the
Commission's adoption, at its 1976 session, of the proposal for
the establishment of an ad hoc group, Belgium proposed the
inclusion of an additional article in CEDAW which called on
States Parties to examine, in the Commission, the possibility of
establishing complaints procedures for individuals and States
Parties." As the Commission's consideration of the draft Con-

supra note 5, at 414, 414-16; REHOF, supra note 5, at 238-39.
9. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
11. Commission on the Status of Women: Summary Record of the 673d Meet-
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vention was by then in its final stages, the Belgian representative did not put forward a detailed draft. Rather, by the proposal she sought to commit states to examine the question of

complaints procedures within a short time after the Convention entered into force.

A number of Western countries supported the Belgian
proposal, but it was eventually defeated. 2 Some delegations
raised technical queries about whether it was appropriate to
refer such a matter to the Commission. A number of delegations also argued that there was a difference between conven-

tions dealing with "serious international crimes"" such as
apartheid and racial discrimination, as opposed to those addressing areas such as discrimination against women, where
states had already begun to cooperate and in which it was
inappropriate to set up a body which would act as a "court of
judgment." 4 These objections reflect what has for a long time
been the prevailing attitude in the Commission towards the
elimination of discrimination against women. 5 They also reflect the view that discrimination against women is not as
grave as other forms of rights violations. The reluctance of
delegations to take up the Belgian proposal may also have
been influenced by the fact that the existing procedures under
the ICCPR and Racial Discrimination Convention had not yet

ing, Resumed 26th Sess., 673d mtg. 9% 93-94, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/SR.673 (1976).
The proposed article read:
As soon as this Convention enters into force, the States Parties undertake to examine, in the Commission on the Status of Women, the possibility of establishing procedures for the implementation of this Convention with a view to enabling States Parties and their nationals to address themselves to the ad hoc Group.
Id. 9 94.
12. See Commission on the Status of Women: Summary Record of the 674th
Meeting, Resumed 26th Sess., 674th Mtg. %%1-31, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/SR.674 (1976)
[hereinafter CSW 674th Mtg.].
13. Id. J 4 (representative of Hungary).
14. Id. 9 12 (representative of Pakistan).
15. See generally Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The
United Nations Approach, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 11 (1981) [hereinafter Human Rights
and Women's Rights]; Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women, in
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 2, at 265. For an institutional view of the separate development, see Contribution from the Centre for Social Development and
HumanitarianAffairs: Work of the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs in Human Rights, World Conf. on Hum. Rts. Preparatory Comm., 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 3-9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/61/Add.5 (1993).
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produced any significant body of case law which permitted an
assessment of the effectiveness of those procedures. 6 Some
opposition was presumably also due to the stage of the
Commission's deliberations at which the Belgian proposal was
put forward. However, the draft article establishing the interstate procedure, now contained in article 29, was proposed and
considered even later, during the General Assembly's consideration of the draft Convention and much later than the Belgian
proposal.
The issue of the need for a complaints procedure was
raised once again following the Commission's conclusion of its
deliberations. The Netherlands, in its comments on the
Commission's draft, suggested that the Convention should
contain a provision for interstate complaints, and also that
"serious consideration should be given to including in the draft
Convention the right of individual petition, providing persons
under the jurisdiction of the States Parties with the opportunity to submit complaints to the supervisory body."' However,
the Netherlands government did not propose a draft of such a
procedure.
The only implementation mechanism contained in the
Convention which confers powers on CEDAW is thus the reporting obligation under article 18 of the Convention, 8 which
obliges States Parties to submit regular reports to the Committee on the steps they have taken to implement the Convention.
In addition, article 29 of the Convention-which is the subject
of a large number of reservations and has never been utilized-establishes a procedure for States Parties to refer disputes over the interpretation or application of the Convention
to the International Court of Justice. 9

16. Although the (First) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR entered into force in
1976, the first decisions taken under the Protocol by the Human Rights Committee
were published in the report of the Human Rights Committee in 1979. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 301 [hereinafter First Optional Protocol]; Torkel
Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 2, at
369, 421 n.220. Article 14 of the Racial Discrimination Convention, which establishes the individual complaints procedure under that Convention, entered into
force only in 1982. See supra note 9, art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at 230.
17. Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Report of the Secretary General, 151, U.N. Doc. A/321218 (1977).
18. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 18, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 22.
19. Id. art. 29., 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
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B. Developments Following the Entry into Force of the
Convention
In the years following the entry into force of the Convention, both CEDAW and those who began to follow its work
focused their attention primarily on establishing the efficient
operation of the reporting procedure. Subsequently, especially
since the late 1980s, efforts have also been devoted to developing other aspects of the work of the Committee falling within
the existing scope of the Convention, such as the formulation
of general recommendations. Nevertheless, both before and
after the establishment of the Committee commentators noted
the lack of an individual communications procedure and the
consequent weakness of the Convention's implementation
mechanisms when compared with those procedures of the
ICCPR and the Racial Discrimination Convention." The possibility of the adoption of an optional protocol was raised by
individual members of CEDAW on a couple of occasions,2 ' but
aroused no general interest in the Committee until the early
1990s.

20. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED
NATIONS 81-82 (1986); Burrows, supra note 5, at 456-57; Noreen Burrows, International Law and Human Rights: the Case of Women's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 80, 93-94, 96 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986); Jost
Delbrdck, Die Konvention der Vereinten Nationen zur Beseitigung jeder Form der
Diskriminierung der Frau von 1979 im Kontext der Bemtihungen urn einen
volkerrechtlicher Schutz der Menschenrechte, in STAATSRECHT-VOLKERRECHTEUROPARECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS JURGEN SCHLOCHAUER 260 (Ingo von Mtinch
ed., 1981); Malvina H. Guggenheim, The Implementation of Human Rights by the
UN Commission on the Status of Women: A Brief Comment, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J.
239, 244 (1977); Theodor Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of
Discrimination Against Women, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 213, 216-17 (1990); Reanda,
Human Rights and Women's Rights, supra note 15, at 22-23; Sarah Z. Zearfoss,
Note, The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst
Women: Radical, Reasonable or Reactionary?, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903, 922-24
(1991). But see Edith Oeser, A New Stage in the Struggle for Equal Rights and
the Promotion of Women: On the Entry into Force of the Convention on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 1982 GDR COMMITTEE HUM. RTS. BULL.
43, 53 (CEDAW "should be regarded as a body facilitating the co-operation of
States Parties for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women,
and not as a high court judge and collecting centre for violations of the treaty").
21. For example, the suggestion was made at the tenth session of the Committee in 1991 that the Committee should propose the possibility of an optional
protocol as part of its contribution to the World Conference on Human Rights.
ANDREW BYRNES, INT'L WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH, CEDAW #10: BUILDING
ON A DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT 22-23 (1991).
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The early 1990s saw the evolution of greater interest in
the possibility of a communications procedure under the Convention along with a number of important institutional developments. In 1991, the Commission conducted a review of its
own procedure for receiving communications on the status of
women (a previous review had been conducted in the early
1980s).22 A report prepared by the Secretary-General for the
Commission noted that the existing procedure was weak when
compared to other mechanisms elsewhere in the U.N. human
rights system, and that relatively little attention was given to
human rights issues of particular concern to women under
other mechanisms, whether treaty-based or Charter-based. The
report set out a number of ways in which existing procedures
might be improved or supplemented in order to ensure that
effective international procedures were available for the enforcement of women's internationally guaranteed human
rights.' These methods included the establishment of a thematic special rapporteur 4 and the adoption of an individual
complaints procedure in an optional protocol to the Convention.
Although it eventually took up a number of the suggestions in
the report, at this stage the Commission did not endorse the
suggestion that a communications procedure be developed for
the Convention.'
At the same time as the Commission was reviewing its
communications procedure, the issue of a protocol additional to

22. Examining Existing Mechanisms for Communications on the Status of
Women: Report of the Secretary General, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 35th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, %%136-156, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/1991/10 (1991).
23. Id.
136-156.
24. This has since occurred in the form of the appointment, by the Commis.
sion on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. Question of integrating the rights of women into the human rights mechanisms of the
United Nations and the elimination of violence Against women, C.H.R. Res.
1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 140, U.N. Doc. E1994/24,
E/CN.41994132 (1994). The first report of the Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, was
submitted to the 1995 session of the Commission on Human Rights. Preliminary
Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Cause
and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th
Sess., Agenda Item 11(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994)
[hereinafter
Coomaraswamy FirstReport].
25. Draft Resolution III, Report of the Commission on the Status of Women on
its Thirty-Seventh Session, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 37th Sess., Supp. No.
7, at 16-17, U.N. Doc. E/1993/27, E/CN.6/1993/18 (1993).
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the Convention arose in another context-that of developing a
new international instrument on violence against women. At
the initiative of the Canadian government, an expert group

meeting was held in November 1991 to consider various options. These options included the adoption of a substantive
protocol to the Convention dealing with the issue of violence
against women, a protocol to the Convention which would
provide both substantive coverage of violence and a complaints
mechanism in respect of violence against women, a protocol
which would provide a complaints procedure in respect of all
the rights guaranteed in the Convention, or a new declaration
or convention dealing with violence again women.2 6 The recommendation of the expert group and that endorsed by the
Commission and the General Assembly was the adoption of a
separate declaration on the subject, leading to the adoption of
the Declaration of the Elimination of Violence against Women
in December 1993.27
These developments were parallel to and, indeed, formed
part of the mobilization for the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights by NGOs concerned with the human rights of
womenY A consistent demand put forward by NGOs and oth-

26. See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Violence Against Women, Division for the Advancement of Women, 'ff 34-37, U.N. Doc. EGMIVAW/199111 (1991).
This document contains a fuller report of the discussion than the final version of
the report submitted to the Commission on the Status of Women. Violence Against
Women in all its Forms: Report of the Secretary-General, Comm'n on the Status of
Women, 36th Sess., Agenda Item 4, qq 25-27, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/1992/4 (1991). For
further discussion of the issues, see Issues in the Development of an International
Instrument on Violence Against Women: Working Paper Prepared by the Government of Canada, U.N. Doc. EGMIVAW/19911WP.1 (1991); Andrew Byrnes, Observations on the Background Paper Prepared by the Government on Canada on Issues
in the Development of an International Instrument on Violence Against Women
(Nov. 11-15, 1991) (corrected version of draft of Nov. 4, 1991 presented to the Expert Group Meeting on Violence against Women, Vienna, on file with author). See
also Elizabeth Evatt, Violence and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of DiscriminationAgainst Women, in INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
COMBATTING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 33, 38-39 (1993); Elizabeth Evatt, Eliminating DiscriminationAgainst Women: The Impact of the UN Convention, 18 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 435 (1991).
27. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA. Res.
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, U.N. Doc. AJRes/48/104 (1994).
28. See generally Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1994); Florence
Butegwa, Women's Human Rights: A Challenge to the InternationalHuman Rights
Community, THE REVIEW (INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS), June 1993, at 71.
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ers29 was that the institutions responsible for overseeing
women's human rights issues, namely the Commission and the
Committee, be strengthened. In addition, calls for an optional
protocol to the Convention were frequently made, as in the
final report of the NGO Forum in Vienna.30
This advocacy campaign was effective and was reflected in
the final document adopted by the World Conference, the Vienna Declaration, and Programme of Action.3 ' The Vienna Declaration stressed the need for women to make effective use of
existing procedures under international human rights instruments. However, it also emphasized the need for the adoption
of new procedures, stating:
New procedures should also be adopted to strengthen implementation of the commitment to women's equality and the
human rights of women. The Commission on the Status of
Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women should quickly examine the possibility of
introducing the right of petition through the preparation of
an optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 2
The question of the preparation of such a protocol to the
Convention was taken up by CEDAW at its 1994 session. The
Committee suggested that the Commission request the convening of an expert group during 1994 to prepare a draft optional
protocol to the Convention and that the report of this meeting
should then be presented to the Committee for its comments
and the Commission for action.33 The Committee also desig29. See, for example, the contribution by the United Nations Development
Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which also suggested the adoption of a complaints
mechanism, in the Report Submitted by the United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM) to the World Conference on Human Rights, World Conf. on
Hum. Rts. Preparatory Comm., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 3, 19-20, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.157/PC/6 lAdd.17 (1993).
30. NGO Forum Final Report: Recommendations Adopted by the Forum of
Non-Governmental Organizations, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEW CONSENSUS, June
1993, at 230,
6, at 231, 4, at 235. The NGO Forum Report is also reprinted
in the extremely useful compendium of documents from the World Conference
prepared by Manfred Nowak entitled WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF NGOs 77, at 78, 81 (Manfred Nowak ed., 1994).
31. Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
pt. II, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/24 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
32. Id. 40.
33. Suggestion No. 5, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-

19961

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

693

nated one of its members to prepare a paper on the subject for
its 1995 session. At its 1994 session, the Commission did not
call for such a meeting, but decided it would examine the feasibility of introducing the right of petition under the Convention
at its 1995 session, "taking into account the results of any governmental expert meeting on the question that may be convened" prior to that session.' 4 This course of action was approved by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)"
Although no governmental expert group meeting was convened during 1994, an independent expert group meeting was
convened by the Women in the Law Project of the International Human Rights Law Group in conjunction with the
Maastricht Centre for Human Rights at the University of
Limburg, with the financial assistance of the Dutch and Australian governments as well as the European Human Rights
Foundation."6 Following detailed consideration of a draft before the meeting,'7 the expert group adopted a draft optional
protocol to the Convention."8 This draft confers jurisdiction on
CEDAW under two complaint procedures, an individual com-

ination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 10, U.N. Doe.
A149/38 (1994).

34. Draft Resolution III, supra note 25, 914.
35. E.S.C. Res. 1994/7, U.N. ESCOR, 40th Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. E/RES/199417,
E/1994/INF/6 (1994).
36. Participants in the meeting, who came from all regions, included members
of CEDAW, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination and other experts in the field of international human rights
and the human rights of women.
37. The discussion draft was annexed to a background paper prepared by the
present authors for the Maastricht meeting. See generally Byrnes & Connors, supra note 1. Background papers were also presented by Justice Silvia Cartwright,
Impact of a Complaints Procedure on CEDAW's Work (Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 1994)
(background paper prepared for the Expert Group Meeting on the Adoption of an
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, organized by the Women in the Law Project, International
Human Rights Law Group and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights, University of Limburg, Maastricht, Netherlands, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law), and Professor Manfred Nowak, while other participants made oral
presentations.
38. The text of the Maastricht draft is appended at the end of this article.
For a detailed discussion of the Maastricht draft which highlights some of its
novel or potentially controversial aspects and which proposes a number of changes,
see Ben Rimmer, Proposals for a Communications and Inquiry Procedure to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(Aug. 1995) (internship paper for the Australian National Internship Program, on
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
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plaints procedure and an inquiry procedure under which the
Committee could investigate situations in which systematic or
serious violations of the Convention are alleged.
At its session held in early 1995, CEDAW once again took
up the issue, basing its consideration on, among other materials, a paper prepared by Justice Silvia Cartwright, one of the
members of the Committee who had attended the Maastricht
meeting.3 9 Her paper outlined the content of the Maastricht
draft, raised a number of additional matters which she believed the Committee might wish to consider in its examination of the issue, and proposed that the Committee endorse the
draft and recommend its adoption by the General Assembly. 0
Following considerable discussion of both general issues and
the specific provisions of the Maastricht draft in one of its
working groups, the Committee adopted, almost unanimously,41 a proposal setting out in detail what it considered to be

39. Silvia Rose Cartwright, An Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 14th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doe.
CEDAW/C/1995/WG.1JWP.1 (1994). The Committee also had before it a paper prepared by the Professor Philip Alston, Chairperson of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which dealt with the issue of a draft optional protocol
containing a complaints procedure under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and which contained a draft similar in many respects
to the Maastricht draft. See Draft Optional Protocol Providing for the Consideration of Communications, Report Submitted by Mr. Philip Alston, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11th Sess., U.N. Doe. E/C.121199412 (1994),
reprinted in RIGHT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
178-98 (Fons Coomans & Fried van Hoof eds., 1995) [hereinafter RIGHT TO COM-

PLAIN]. An Expert Group meeting held in Utrecht in late January 1995 took the
Alston draft as a basis for its discussions and adopted a draft optional protocol
which drew heavily on the Alston draft. DRAFT OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: ADOPTED BY
THE UTRECHT EXPERT GROUP MEETING (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights,

1995), reprinted in RIGHT TO COMPLAIN, supra, at 233 [hereinafter Utrecht Draft
Protocol]. Both of these instruments also drew on the Maastricht draft. For a
discussion of the Alston draft by the Committee, see Summary Record of the 50th
Meeting, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.121995/SR.50 (1995) (comments by ILO, American Association of Jurists, and
Foodfirst Information and Action Network).
40. Cartwright, supra note 39, at 5.
41. Although only one member of the Committee, the expert from Indonesia
(Ms. Hartono), chose to dissent from the Committee's decision, the experts from
China (Ms. Lin) and Japan (Ms. Sato) expressed reservations about various aspects
of the proposal in the course of the discussions within the Committee. See Summary Record of the 282nd Meeting, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, 14th Sess., 282d mtg., 99 13-19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.282
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the desirable features of an optional protocol to the Convention
(Suggestion No. 7).42 The views expressed by the Committee
correspond in essence to the content of the Maastricht draft,
but apparently the Committee thought that it was more appropriate to express its support in this form rather than simply to
endorse what was in effect an NGO draft."
At its 1995 session, the Commission once again took up
the issue of an optional protocol to the Convention, on the
basis of CEDAW's suggestion. On this occasion, the Commission requested that the Secretary-General invite governments,
intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs "to submit their
views on an optional protocol to the Convention, including
those related to feasibility, taking into account the elements
suggested by the Committee in its Suggestion No. 7.$4 The
Commission further requested the Secretary-General to compile a report based on these comments45 which would then be
considered by a sessional working group of the Commission at
its 1996 session, "with a view to elaborating a draft optional
protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women."" This course of action was
endorsed by the Economic and Social Council.47
In August 1995, the Secretary-General of the United Nations circulated notes verbales in terms of the ECOSOC resolution. Member states, as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations framed their views against the

(1995).
42. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 8, U.N. Doc. A150/38 (1995). For
a summary of the proposal endorsed by the Committee, see INT'L HUM. RTS. LAW
GROUP, THE ADOPTION OF A PETITION PROCEDURE UNDER TIE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: THE PROPOSAL
BY THE

COMMITIEE ON THE ELIMINATION

OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

(1995).

43. Support for an optional protocol was also expressed by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in her initial report, Coomaraswamy First
Report, supra note 24, %317, as well as by the meeting organized by the Council
of Europe as part of its contribution to the World Conference on Women. "Equality
and democracy: Utopia or challenge?" - Reports from the Discussion Groups and
Conclusions by the General Rapporteur, EG/DEM(95)19 at 36.
44. Report of the Thirty-Ninth Session: Draft Resolution III, U.N. ESCOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 5, U.N. Doc. E11995/26, EICN.6/1995/14 (1995).
45. Id. 6.
46. Id. 7.
47. E.S.C. Res. 1995/29 (1995).
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background of the outcome of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, held in Beijing in September 1995. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action gave further momentum to the
process, stating that in light of the report the Secretary- General would provide, States Parties should "support the process
initiated by the Commission on the Status of Women with a
view to elaborating a draft [optional protocol] that could enter
into force as soon as possible. ' S
In the following sections of this article we address the
issues of the desirability and feasibility of an optional protocol
to the Women's Convention. The draft optional protocol adopted by the Maastricht expert group meeting forms the basis of
our discussion. This is because CEDAW's Suggestion No. 7,
setting out the elements of an optional protocol, essentially
adopts the content of the draft optional protocol adopted by the
Maastricht expert group meeting, and can therefore be taken
as an endorsement of that draft. It was also the Maastricht
draft which framed the discussion of the issue of an optional
protocol during the Commission's 1995 session and which is
likely to feature in any future discussion of the form and content of an optional protocol.
III. GENERAL IsSUES AND CONCERNS

The Maastricht draft proposes to confer on the Committee49 the following powers:

48. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conf. on Women,

230, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995).

49. At the time of the preparation of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggestions were made that States
Parties should establish a committee separate from that established under the
ICCPR for the consideration of communications. This suggestion was not taken up.
See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DE-

VELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS T

4.4, at 124 (1991). Thus, communications under the ICCPR as well as under the
Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, the Convention against Torture
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, G.A. Res. 39/46,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention], and the International Convention on the Protection of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for signature May 2,

1991, GA. Res. 45/148, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 261, U.N. Doc.
A145/49 (1990), reprinted in 30 IL.M. 1517 [hereinafter MWC], are channelled to
the expert committees established under those treaties. In the discussion about an
optional protocol to the Women's Convention, it has been taken for granted that
CEDAW will exercise a similar jurisdiction.
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1) to receive complaints from individuals or groups that they
have suffered harm as a consequence of a failure by a State
to fulfil its obligations under the Convention (an individual
complaints procedure); and
2) to inquire on its own motion into the situation in a State
Party on the receipt by the Committee of reliable information
which indicates a systematic pattern of serious violations of
the Convention (an inquiry procedure).
The proposed protocol to the Convention is strictly optional
and would apply only to those States Parties who ratify or
accede to its terms. No additional substantive or procedural
obligations would be imposed upon States Parties to the Convention which chose not to ratify the protocol.
This proposal for an optional protocol, like other similar
proposals, gives rise to a number of fundamental questions
which need to be addressed. What is the justification for adopting such a procedure? Is it likely to advance efforts to ensure
that women enjoy their human rights in practice? Are the obligations contained in the Convention really amenable to a quasi-judicial procedure? Would such a procedure unnecessarily
duplicate the protection available under existing human rights
instruments? Would the human and financial resources necessary to the effective functioning of such a procedure be made
available? Before examining the fundamental question of
whether the obligations contained in the Convention are justiciable or amenable to enforcement procedures of the type contained in the Maastricht draft, and before considering the
Maastricht draft in detail, we canvass the justification for
adopting mechanisms such as those proposed.

If an optional protocol is adopted and enters into force, it is highly likely
that a number of the members of CEDAW will be nationals of states which are
not party to the Optional Protocol and may, indeed, be nationals of states who
oppose the Protocol. The practice of other expert committees, such as the Human
Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
as well as the European Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights is to allow independent experts, no matter what
the position of the state of their nationality, to participate fully in the communications process. Again, there seems no reason why this practice should not be followed in the context of CEDAW.
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A. The Justification for a Communications Procedure Under
the Women's Convention
The means of implementation and enforcement provided
for under the Convention are limited to a reporting procedure
involving submission of regular reports to the Committee pursuant to article 1850 and a limited interstate procedure under
article 29 which confers jurisdiction not on the Committee, but
on the- International Court of Justice." Unlike a number of
other human rights treaties, the Convention has no individual
communications procedure. The ultimate justification for
adopting a communications procedure for the Convention must
be that it will promote the more effective implementation of
the Convention and thereby enhance the enjoyment by women
of the rights it guarantees.2 The existence of a wide variety
of communications procedures, both within the U.N. system
and at the regional level, manifests an international consensus
that such procedures can play an important role in bringing
about the more effective enjoyment of internationally guaranteed human rights. While it would be naive to overstate the
achievements and potential of such procedures, experience has
shown that they can make a valuable contribution to the protection of human rights.
In our view, the adoption of an individual complaints procedure or an inquiry procedure along the lines of those proposed in the Maastricht draft would contribute significantly to
the more effective implementation of the Convention. 3 At the
same time, we recognize that the proposal gives rise to questions about legal feasibility, the availability of resources, and
concerns about the proliferation and overlap of human rights
instruments and enforcement procedures. Nevertheless, we

50. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 18, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 22.
51. Id. art. 29, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
52. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in relation
to arguments that could be adduced in support of an optional protocol to the Economic Covenant: "Ultimately, of course, the most compelling is that the aggregate
enjoyment of economic rights by individuals and groups throughout the world will
be significantly enhanced thereby." ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, a 20.
53. This is a view shared by many commentators, as well as by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women itself. See Report by the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Fourth World
Conference on Women, % 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (1995) [hereinafter CEDAW
World Conference Report].
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argue that concerns relating to these issues can be overcome,
or are not so significant as to outweigh the advantages of communications procedures. We maintain that providing an avenue for an independent expert body to evaluate allegations
that a State Party has failed to give effect to its obligations
under the Convention has the potential to provide redress for
individual grievances, to stimulate changes in discriminatory
laws and practices, and to create greater public awareness of
international human rights standards relating to discrimination against women. The adoption of such a procedure would
make a significant additional contribution to the existing
mechanisms for the implementation of human rights presently
available within the U.N. system.
The procedures proposed in the Maastricht draft are based
on existing international models which have made an important contribution to the implementation of international human rights standards. Each of the proposed procedures offers a
different approach to enhancing the implementation of the
obligations assumed by States Parties to the Convention, and
different issues and types of complaints may arise under the
two mechanisms.
B. Existing Individual Communications Procedures
At present, three out of the six major U.N. human rights
treaties in force vest their supervisory bodies with jurisdiction
to receive and consider individual complaints.'

54. At the regional level, individual and interstate procedures are included in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights], and the American Convention on
Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention
on Human Rights]. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doe. CAB/LEG/67/3fRev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), contains an interstate communications procedure, as well as a procedure
for considering communications which evidence serious or massive violations of
human or peoples' rights. Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child,
July 11, 1990, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, and the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Bel6m do Pard), opened for signature June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1995), also make provision for individual complaints. Within the framework of the International Labour Organization, "individual" complaints
procedures (under which a complaint may be made by a workers' organization or
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The International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (the MWC),5 5 which
is not yet in force, also establishes such a procedure. The possible adoption of an individual complaints procedure for the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (the Economic Covenant)56 has been under consideration by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in recent years,5 7 as has the adoption of a communications procedure of limited scope to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Children's Convention)."

an organization of employers) and interstate complaints procedures exist, as well
as a procedure which can be initiated by the Governing Body of the ILO on its
own motion. Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, art. 26, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 86 [hereinafter ILO Constitution]. For a positive assessment of the impact of the various
ILO procedures, see Klaus Samson, The Standard-Setting and Supervisory System
of the International Labour Organization, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A
EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 115, 142-44 (Krzysztof Drzewicki et al. eds., 1994).
55. MWC, supra note 49.
56. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Economic Covenant].
57. See generally MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON EcoNOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 98-102 (1995); RIGHT TO COMPLAIN, supra
note 39.
58. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 29, 1989, GA. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). The Commission on
Human Rights has recently considered the question of an optional protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflicts. A proposal for the inclusion of an inquiry procedure similar to that contained in the Convention against Torture was made by Poland. Report of the
Working Group on a Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, Conm'n on Hum. Rts., 51st
Sess., Agenda Item 24,
189-194, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1995/96 (1995). Discussions
on the possible adoption of an optional protocol to the Children's Convention dealing with the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography are also
proceeding in the Commission on Human Rights, but the only implementation
mechanism proposed is reporting to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. See
Report of the Working Group on the Question of a Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child Dealing with the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, as well as the Basic Measures Needed for
Their Prevention and Eradication, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Agenda Item
24(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.41995/95 (1995). The adoption of a complaints mechanism
under the European Social Charter has also been under consideration. See Request
for an Opinion from the Comm. of Ministers on the Draft Second Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter,Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 6730 (1993). See generally
D.J. Harris, A Fresh Impetus for the European Social Charter, 41 INTL & COMP.
L.Q. 659, 673-74 (1992). The Additional Protocol was adopted on June 22, 1995
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The existence of individual communications procedures
under international and regional treaties currently in force,
and the proposed new procedures, suggest that there is a consensus on the importance of such an individual complaints
procedure to supplement reporting as a means of promoting
and monitoring the implementation of international human
rights treaties. This belief underlies the existing procedures of
the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture
Convention), and the Racial Discrimination Convention, and
has been advanced in support of proposals that an individual
complaints procedure be adopted for the Economic Covenant.
While the impact of international procedures may appear limited, the experience of the Human Rights Committee under the
ICCPR, as well as that of other bodies exercising a similar
competence, has had a beneficial impact on the development of
human rights standards and their implementation at the national level, as well as leading to the resolution of a number of
individual complaints.
An individual communications procedure would contribute
to the implementation of the Convention's goals by providing
the possibility for specific redress in individual cases and by
affording the opportunity for development by the Committee of
a detailed jurisprudence of these goals. This goal would help to
bring about changes to laws and practices which presently
discriminate against women. The development of a body of
case law under the Convention would assist States Parties in
determining the content of their obligations under the Convention and thus assist them in implementing those obligations.
Rein Miillerson, a former member of the Human Rights
Committee, has identified three different functions which individual complaints procedures may, in principle, promote:
[Flirst, as a result of considering such a complaint an individual, whose rights have been violated, may have a remedy

and opened for signature on November 9, 1995. 34 I.L.M. 1453 (1995). There are
also proposals for the inclusion of a guarantee of the right of women and men to

equality in the European Convention on Human Rights, which would extend the
present justiciable guarantee to all categories of rights. See Steering Committee for
Equality between Women and Men: Reasoned Proposal on a Fundamental Right of

Women and Men to Equality for Inclusion in a Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDEG(94)3 addendum I.
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against the wrong suffered by him, and the violation could be
stopped and/or compensation paid, etc.; second, considering a
complaint may result not only in a remedy for the victim of
the violation, whose complaint has been considered, but also
in changes to internal legislation and practice; and third, an
individual complaint (or more often, a series of complaints)
may serve as evidence of systematic and/or massive violations
of certain rights in a given country. 9
However, Miillerson is of the opinion that in practice an individual complaint procedure serves only the second function. 0
In a similar vein, Bernhard Graefrath, another former member
of that Committee, maintains that such a procedure "can do
little" to protect an individual's rights, as it "starts too late,
takes too much time, does not lead to binding results and lacks
any effective enforcement."' While there is a good element of
truth in this criticism, the assessment of the worth of such
procedures from the perspective of the individual complainant
appears unduly negative. Nevertheless, Miillerson, Graefrath,
and other commentators accept the importance of such procedures for the elaboration of the legal content of international
human rights standards.6 2
In its discussion of the desirability of an individual complaints procedure under the Economic Covenant, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted a number of
advantages that might follow from the adoption of an individual complaints procedure." A number of those advantages apply with similar force to the case of the Women's Convention.

59. Rein Millerson, The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The
Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE: COMPARING INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS 25, 27 (Arie

Bloed et al. eds., 1993).
60. Id. at 27-28.

61. Bernhard Graefrath, Reporting and Complaint Systems in Universal Human Rights Treaties, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING EAST/WEST PERSPEoTIVE
290, 327 (Allan Rosas & Jan Helgesen eds., 1990); BERNHARD GRAEFRATH,
MENSCHENRECHTE UND INTERNATIONALE KOOPERATION 170-71 (1988) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONALE KOOPERATION].

62. ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, 30 ("[TIhe vast majority of commentators who have assessed the work of the Human Rights Committee have
acknowledged the enormous importance of the procedure [under the (First) Optional Protocol] in terms of its contribution to an enhanced understanding of the normative implications of many of the provisions contained in the Covenant.").
63. Id. %%33-38.
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They include:
1) bringing concrete and tangible issues into relief;
2) the focus on a particular case provides a framework for
inquiry which is otherwise absent, permitting a detailed
examination of legislation and facts in context;
3) the possibility that complaints will be brought to an international forum should encourage governments to ensure that
more effective local remedies are available;
4) the availability of a potential international remedy may
provide an incentive to individuals and groups to formulate
some of their claims in more precise terms in relation to the
provisions of the Convention, a development which could
contribute towards bridging the gap between human rights
concerns narrowly construed and broader social justice issues;
and
5) the possibility of an adverse finding would give the rights
concerned a salience in terms of the political concerns of
Governments that those rights very largely lack at present.
The consideration of individual cases provides a supervisory
body with the opportunity to interpret human rights guarantees in a manner which general discussions and exegeses do
not provide. For example, although the Human Rights Committee has in its general comments explained the content of
many of the rights contained in the ICCPR, these comments
tend to provide only very limited assistance in the resolution of
individual cases at the national level. On the other hand, the
Human Rights Committee's case law, as well as the decisions
of other international and regional bodies with a complaints
jurisdiction, have often proved of much greater utility in that
regard.' The detailed general recommendations of CEDAW,
some of which are extremely useful, suffer from the same limitations in this context as the general comments of the Human
Rights Committee.
An individual communications procedure would enhance
the profile of the Convention and CEDAW, thereby generating
greater awareness of the obligations of States Parties, particu-

64. Cf. Opsahl, supra note 16, at 440; ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1,
q 28, 31. This has certainly been the case in Hong Kong, where the ICCPR has
been directly incorporated as part of domestic law.
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larly at the national level.65 Again, the experience of the Human Rights Committee is instructive here. Communications to
and resolution of those communications by the Human Rights
Committee attract far more attention at all levels, including
among the press and public, than the reports submitted by
States Parties pursuant to article 40 of the ICCPR.
C. Justificationfor an Inquiry Procedure
The Maastricht draft proposes the adoption of an inquiry
procedure based on the one contained in article 20 of the Torture Convention, which itself draws on other models, including
International Labour Organization (110) inquiry procedures
and the Resolution 1503 procedure.66 The purpose of this inquiry procedure is to provide the Committee with the power to
investigate a situation in which it is clear that there are grave
or systematic violations of the Convention in a State Party.
The proposed procedure, which could be used to address serious one-off violations, such as sati, or widespread violations
such as trafficking in women, or violations of women's human
rights in situations of armed conflict, would allow for particularly egregious cases or large-scale abuses to be addressed on a
timely basis.
There are a number of reasons which justify the inclusion
of an inquiry procedure in the draft. First, individual communications may fail to reflect the systematic nature of widespread violations. Second, in situations of very serious or widespread violations, individuals or groups may face acute dan-

65. But see ECSRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, J 12.
66. Other models drawn on include the communications procedure established

by UNESCO Executive Board. See Evaluations of the Procedures Adopted by the
Executive Board for the Examination of Communications Concerning Violations of
Human Rights Falling Within UNESCO's Fields of Competence: 104 EX/Decision
3.3, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive
Board, 120th Sess., Decision 120 EXI17, Annex MI, Agenda Item 5.5.1, U.N. Doc.
23 C/17 (1984) (104 EX/Decision 3.3 is set forth in Annex II) [hereinafter
UNESCO Decision]. This permits UNESCO to consider not just cases involving
individual violations of the rights within UNESCO's sphere of competence, but also
"questions of massive, systematic or flagrant violations of human rights resulting
either from a policy contrary to human rights, applied de jure or de facto by a
state, or from an accumulation of individual cases forming a consistent pattern."
The Administration of Justice and The Human Rights of Detainees: Report of the
Secretary-General, Coxm'n. on Human Rights, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 12,
U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1995/17/Add.1 (1995).
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gers of reprisal or practical constraints on their ability to submit communications.6 7 Third, the experience of the Committee
against Torture (CAT) suggests that an inquiry procedure
allows an international body to address a broader range of
issues than it is able to in the context of individual communications. Finally, again drawing on the experience of the CAT,
an inquiry procedure provides the international body with an
opportunity to recommend measures to combat the structural
causes of violations. CAT's first report, for example, set out a
series of broad recommendations, which included the enforcement and amendment of laws and the establishment of national machinery
to combat torture, as well as other detailed mea68
sures.
D. An Interstate Procedure
Although the draft put before the Maastricht meeting did
include an interstate procedure, such a procedure was not
included in the final Maastricht draft. As existing interstate
procedures in UN human rights treaties have never been utilized, the meeting decided that inclusion of such a procedure
would amount to an essentially empty gesture.
It is certainly the case that, to date, existing interstate
procedures under other U.N. human rights treaties have not
been used.6 9 Moreover, the limited interstate mechanism in

67. For example, the organization which has been most prominent in activating the article 20 procedure under the Torture Convention has been Amnesty
International. Such international NGOs - which are often in a better position to
document systematic violations of rights without fear of reprisal - may not have
standing to submit complaints under the individual communications procedure,
while individuals and groups with standing may not be able to do so, either for
lack of resources or for fear of reprisal.
68. Summary account of the proceedings concerning the inquiry on Turkey,
Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 44,
U.N. Doc. A/48/44/Add.1 (1993). See also Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization, in A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra
note 2, at 580, 609-11; Cecilia Medina, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of the
Enjoyment of Human Rights by Women in the Inter-American System, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at
257, 273-74.
69. See generally Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUIM. RTS.
Q. 249 (1988). The procedure under the ICCPR has been described by a former
member of the Human Rights Committee, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, as "a Pandora's
Box, which all parties prefer to keep shut." Rosalyn Higgins, Encouraging Human
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the Women's Convention itself has never been used and is
subject to a large number of reservations. It well may be that
factors which have inhibited recourse to these procedures in
the past would affect any interstate procedure established
under the Women's Convention.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of use of existing interstate
procedures, they have been included in other treaties recently
adopted (for example, the Torture Convention 7 and the
MWC 7 '). Interstate procedures have been used both within
the ILO and the European human rights systems." The recent trend towards greater recourse to binding international
adjudication within the International Court of Justice also
suggests that there is more promise in an interstate procedure
than might have been thought a decade ago. It may be unfortunate, therefore, that an interstate procedure was not included in the Maastricht draft.73 Excluding the current faint pos-

Rights, 2 L.SE. Q. 249, 254 (1988).
70. Torture Convention, supra note 49, art. 21.
at 1531.
71. MWC, supra note 49, art. 76, 30 I.M.
72. See Andrew Byrnes, The Committee against Torture, in A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 2, at 509, 533-34.
73. There are two main models for such a procedure. The first model is the
one which appears in existing United Nations human rights treaties, see, for example, article 41 of the ICCPR, supra note 10, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182, and article 21
of the Torture Convention, supra note 49, as well as articles 11 to 13 of the Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, 660 U.N.T.S. at 226-30.
These procedures are essentially a conciliation or mediation procedure, in
which the relevant committee offers its good offices in order to help bring about a
settlement between the States Parties concerned. If this cannot be achieved, the
matter may then be referred to an ad hoc conciliation commission which has a
no settlement is possible, neither the Committee nor the
similar function. If still
ad hoc commission is empowered to express its opinion on whether a violation of
the Convention has occurred, nor is provision made for reference to binding adjudication by a body such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The second model and the one embodied in the draft before the Maastricht
meeting is that contained in articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution. Under this
procedure the supervisory body is given conciliation or mediation functions, but
receives in addition a substantive power to express a view on the merits and to
make recommendations to the State Party. The State Party concerned is expected
to comply with these recommendations, unless it proposes to refer the matter to
the ICJ. ILO Constitution, supra note 54, arts. 26-34, 15 U.N.T.S. at 84-93.
The significant difference between a procedure drawing on the ILO model
and existing models is that the role of the Committee would not be limited to
conciliation or mediation, but would extend to the formulation of a view on the
merits, with which States Parties would be obliged to comply. The procedure under the Racial Discrimination Convention provides that the conciliation commission
may make recommendations; however, the States Parties are free to accept or
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sibility of interstate complaints would mean that the Women's
Convention is once again not placed on a par with existing
human rights treaties, although it should be noted that the
current proposals for a communications procedure for the Economic Covenant contain neither an interstate nor an inquiry
procedure. On the other hand, that interstate procedures are
rarely used suggests the procedures may be unsatisfactory and
thus that a new model may be required. 4 In all likelihood,
inclusion of such a procedure would have considerably lengthened any draft protocol and complicated the process of persuading states to adopt a protocol to the Convention.
IV. GENERAL CONCERNS
The elaboration and adoption of any complaints procedure
to the Women's Convention is likely to raise, yet again, the
issue of the international community's real commitment to the
rhetoric of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of
human rights generally, and the inalienability, integrity, and
indivisibility of the human rights of women in particu7 -issues most recently addressed at the Fourth World
larx
Conference on Women in September 1995. While discussion of
the proposed protocol is likely to focus on legal and technical
matters apparently unrelated to states' avowed commitment to
strengthening the enforcement mechanisms for the human
rights of women, it is likely that some states at least will rely
on these arguments to conceal a fundamental unwillingness to
give effect to that commitment in practice.
In this section of the article, we review the major concerns
reject these recommendations. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art.
13(2), 660 U.N.T.S. at 230.
The existing U.N. procedures have been criticized for their failure to include
such a power, and in our view a procedure along the lines of the ILO procedure is
to be preferred. The procedure proposed in the draft before the Maastricht meeting
was, in fact, similar to that which was originally proposed by the Commission on
Human Rights for the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, but that proposal was
watered down during the drafting process. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 587-89 (1993).
74. Fried van Hoof, Explanatory Note on the Utrecht Draft Optional Protocol,
in RIGHT TO COMPLAIN, supra note 39, at 147, 158-59, suggests in the context of
the Economic Covenant adoption of a protocol involves an attempt to "juridify" the
issue, and that a system of inter-state communications "might very well produce
the opposite result."
75. Vienna Declaration,supra note 31, q 5, 18.
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that are likely to be raised. These concerns include the question of justiciability, the fact that many violations of women's
human rights occur at the hands of private individuals, and
the question of whether a complaints procedure is inappropriate or should be limited because of the impact of custom, culture, and religion in the context of women's rights. We then
consider the relevance of reservations to any complaints procedure.
A. The JusticiabilityIssue
A major concern relating to any proposed optional protocol
to the Convention is whether the obligations accepted by
States Parties to the Convention are ones which can or should
be made subject to communications procedures, particularly of
the nature proposed. In other words, if an optional protocol
establishes a procedure for considering complaints against
States Parties alleging a failure to fulfill their obligations,
these obligations must be capable of measurement or determination by that body.76 Many of the obligations in the Convention leave a large measure of discretion to States Parties. This
76. The question of whether the Convention's obligations are "justiciable" from
an international perspective is analytically distinct from whether it will be considered "self-executing" or directly applicable in whole or part under national law. See
Marc J. Bossuyt, The Direct Applicability of International Instruments on Human
Rights (with special reference to Belgian and U.S. law), 15 RevUE BELGE DE DROIT
INT'L 317, 317-20 (1981). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for example, notes that some of the provisions of the Racial Discrimination
Convention may not be self-executing under national law, but this does not lead it
to suggest that they would not be amenable to review under the individual complaints procedure under article 14 of that Convention. COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS: PROGRESS REPORT
OF THE COMtMTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, at 24-25,

U.N. Doc. IR/PUB/91/4 (1991). Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights accepts that the unwillingness of some national courts to enforce
the provisions of the Covenant does not mean that the Committee would not be
able to scrutinize the performance of States Parties at the international level.
ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, ff1[ 24-35. Of course, some of the same
factors which might lead a domestic court to refuse to enforce a treaty provision
directly-such as vagueness-may well make it non-justiciable at the international
level. However, the factors are not identical. For example, a treaty provision that
requires a state to enact implementing legislation might be justiciable as a matter
of international law, but may not give rise to an enforceable individual right under many national systems of law. See also Martin Scheinin, Direct Applicability of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Critique of the Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE, supra

note 54, at 73, 79-85.
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discretionary element leads to arguments that the obligations
imposed are largely a matter of self-regulation and self-judgment by individual States Parties, and are thus too open-ended
to be the subject of meaningful external scrutiny." The element of discretion also leads to arguments that, because of the
claimed difficulty of meaningfully assessing whether a state
has violated or failed to fulfil these obligations, to subject
them to a communication procedure which requires a "decision" on that issue will tend to bring the process of enforcement under other procedures, which deal with obligations
which may appear to be more precise, into disrepute."8
This concern-which, broadly speaking, may be termed the
justiciability issue-has also arisen in the context of the Economic Covenant, and more generally in the discussion of the
nature of economic, social, and cultural rights (which discussion has considered the appropriateness of designating these as
"rights" at all). From the outset, it should be emphasized that
not all of the obligations contained in the Convention are discretionary despite the views expressed by some commentators. 9 Accordingly, many provisions of the Convention impose
77. See, e.g., Delbrick, supra note 20, at 261-62.
78. Cf. Matti Pellonpdd, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 855, 871-72 (R. St. J.
Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
79. One commentator, for example, maintains that "this Convention is promotional and programmatic; it does not impose immediately binding legal obligations
" WARWICK MCKEAN,
but requires parties to take 'all appropriate measures . . . ..
EQuALITy AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (1983). However,
this assessment appears to overlook those provisions of the Convention which
plainly do impose immediate obligations, and represents the more traditional view
of "programmatic" obligations which has been fundamentally challenged since
McKean wrote. See Yuji Iwasawa, The Impact of InternationalHuman Rights Law
on Japanese Law: The Third Reformation for Japanese Women, 34 JAPANESE ANN.
INTVL L. 21, 26-28 (1991). The Swiss government, in its message to the Swiss
legislature proposing ratification of the Convention recognizes that a number of
articles may be capable of direct application as part of Swiss law. Botschaft
betreffend das tGbereinkommen von 1979 zur Beseitigung jeder Form von
Diskriminierung der Frau [Message concerning the Convention of 1979 on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women] (Aug. 25-27, 1995).
However, the argumentation does not discuss the very clear wording of article 2,
nor does it address the developments in thinking about the nature of economic,
social and cultural rights and obligations of progressive implementation. Similarly,
the Letter of Submittal to President Carter from the United States Department of
State, which accompanied the President's Letter of Transmittal to the United
States Senate in 1980 recommending ratification of the Convention by the United
States, also claimed that "[v]irtually all the articles of the Convention are, in our
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obligations which are clearly justiciable. However, other provi-

sions may not at first glance appear to be justiciable to those
whose views are predominantly shaped by the traditional
thinking that only classical civil and political rights guarantees
are justiciable. We argue, however, that such provisions are in
fact justiciable.
There have been a number of developments in international human rights law that challenge this "traditional" approach
and which should, therefore, help to allay concerns relating to
the justiciability of the provisions of the Women's Convention.
First, considerable progress has been made in the analysis of
the nature of economic, social, and cultural rights. Second,
obligations of progressive implementation have been shown to
be amenable to external scrutiny."0
Traditional ideas about the difference in nature of civil
and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights
have been shown to be oversimplistic in that they unduly emphasize the negative dimensions of the former category, while
neglecting the positive steps that states must take to afford
those rights. Conversely, there has been an overemphasis on
the positive obligations of the state in the context of economic,

judgment, not self-executing and would probably not be construed as such since
they appear to contemplate that legislative or other implementing action be taken
by the parties (beyond ratification) in order to carry out the Convention's provisions" Letter of Submittal by the Secretary of State to the President (Oct. 23,
1980), reprinted in MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 135-38 (1987). These

national assessments, like similar assessments by the Austrian and German governments referred to in the Swiss government's message, may well be influenced
by the domestic context in which they are made, namely the existence of a political imperative to minimize the impact of the provisions of treaties on existing
domestic law, especially where the treaties will override that law if inconsistent
with it and found to be directly applicable or self-executing. Botschaft, supra, at
27.
80. As the inter-American Court of Human Rights has commented:
The dividing line between those economic, social and cultural rights that
may come to enjoy an international protection on a regional basis in
which the Inter-American Court may intervene, and the remaining rights,
which cannot today be covered by a judicial protection system that is
part of the Courts adjudicatory jurisdiction, is not an immutable and
fixed line resulting from an ontological distinction. Rather, in large part,
the dividing line will be the product of the historical circumstances surrounding the development of the law.
Observations of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Draft Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, 1986 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 440, 9 11, at 446.
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social, and cultural rights, at the expense of recognition that
these rights may also be promoted by insisting that the state
refrain from taking certain actions."' A more nuanced model
of state obligation has now emerged. A state's obligation in
relation to all categories of rights may be seen as involving different types of obligations which can be fulfilled variously by
positive action, by refraining from acting, or by creating an
environment in which rights can be achieved. A commitment to
elucidating the content of a number of key economic, social,
and cultural rights, such as the right to food, housing 2 and
health, and an exploration of the use of statistical indicators,
has belied the traditional claim that these rights are too vague
and insufficiently detailed to admit of measurement.
A popular typology identifies three, or perhaps four, dimensions of the obligations of a state in relation to any given
human right. These dimensions have been described in the
context of economic, social, and cultural rights (in particular
the right to food) as:
1) at a primary level, the obligation to respect, which "calls
for the non-interference by the State, in all cases where the
individuals, or groups, can take care of their own needs"
2) at a secondary level, the obligation to protect, which "implies the responsibility of States to counteract or prevent
activities and processes which negatively affect [the enjoyment of the right]"

81. See, e.g., G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 97 (P.
Alston & K. Tomasevski eds., 1984); Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International
Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769, 832-41 (1989); Philip
Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM.
RTS. Q. 156 (1987); Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand

or Justiciable Guarantees: Social Rights in the New South African Constitution,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 72-84 (1992); The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Final Report submitted by Mr. Danilo Tark, Special Rapporteur,
Comin'n on Hum. Rts., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. EFCN.4/Sub.2/1992/16
(1992); CRAVEN, supra note 57, at 106-14; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW TO USE IT 99-102 (1994).

82. Scott Leckie, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the Right to Adequate Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach, 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 522 (1989); The Right to Adequate Housing: Progress Report Submitted by
Mr. Rajindar Sachar, Special Rapporteur, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Agen-

da Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/15 (1993).
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3) at a tertiary level, the obligation to assist and to fulfill,
that is to provide to those who do not have the resources to
provide for themselves."
This analysis has been bolstered by the many recent developments in the jurisprudence of international and regional
human rights bodies in which the positive obligation side of
civil and political rights, traditionally described as "negative"
rights, has been stressed.84 Not only has it been pointed out
that many of the classic rights which require the state only to
refrain from infringing conduct also require the expenditure of
considerable social resources to provide the relevant institutions (the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, for example, requires the allocation of considerable resources in order to erect and maintain a court system),
but also that a state may be required to take positive steps to
ensure that a right is enjoyed, or protected against infringement by private individuals. These developments have broken
down the rigid characterizations of civil and political rights,
and economic, social, and cultural rights as inherently different
conceptual categories. It has also been shown that many aspects of economic, social, and cultural rights are in fact dealt
with within the framework of existing civil and political rights
guarantees, largely because these guarantees are generally

83. ASBJoRN EiDE, RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT 5I 169-81,
U.N. Sales No. E.89-XIV.2 (1989); Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 21, 37-38 (Asbjcrn Eide et al. eds., 1995); Asbjorn Eide, The Right to an
Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra, at 89, 99-105 (proposing an additional
dimension in this context, the duty to be the provider). In his application of this

framework to the right to housing, Scott Leckie adds the obligation to promote the
right, which "compels governments to recognize the multifaceted human rights
dimensions of housing and to take steps to ensure that no measures are taken
with the intention of deliberately eroding the legal and practical status of this
right." Scott Leckie, The Right to Housing, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra, at 107, 113-14; Cees Flinterman, The Protection of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights, in 3 THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 165
(Rick Lawson & Matthijs de Blois eds., 1994); CRAVEN, supra note 57, at 106-14.
84. See Andrew Clapham's exhaustive study, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE
SPHERE 188-244 (1993). See also Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Abstention or Involvement?
The Nature of State Obligations under Different Categories of Rights, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE, supra note 54, at 43, 52-60;
Scott & Macklem, supra note 81, at 43-71.
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accompanied by a complaints procedure. 5
Two aspects of these developments are of particular relevance to concerns about the justiciability of many of the obligations under the Women's Convention. First, claims that economic, social, and cultural rights are too vaguely formulated to
be justiciable have been seriously challenged. Indeed, international and national cases convincingly show that many economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable in important
respects. 8 Second, the claim that the manner in which a state
carries out its obligations of result or of progressive implementation, such as the obligation to take "necessary" or "appropriate" steps to achieve a stated goal, is not capable of meaningful
external scrutiny by international bodies has also been called
into question. It has been maintained that obligations of pro85. See, e.g., Leckie, supra note 83, at 116-18; Martin Scheinin, Economic and
Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
TEXTBOOK, supra note 83, at 41, 44-52.
86. It may also be noted that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has on occasion stated, following the review of States Parties' reports,
that it considers that the position in a state is inconsistent with provisions of the
Economic Covenant. See, e.g., Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations on the Report
26,
of the United Kingdom, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. Doc E/C.1211994/19 (1994) (stating that the separation of families under Hong
Kong immigration law was "inconsistent with obligations under article 10 of the
Covenant"). See Andrew Byrnes, Will the Government Put Its Money Where its
Mouth Is?: The Verdict of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights on Hong Kong's Human Rights Record, 25 HONG KONG L.J. 156 (1995). In
similar and indeed more pronounced fashion, the Committee of Independent Experts established to review reports of States Parties under the European Social
Charter regularly pronounces on whether it considers that a state has "complied"
or failed to comply "fully" with the obligations it has assumed under the Charter.
Interestingly, the Committee also allows itself a third option, a conclusion that the
Committee is "unable to say" whether the state is or is not complying with the
provisions. For example, the Committee was prepared to find that a state had not
complied fully with obligations to provide for additional paid holidays or reduced
working hours for workers in dangerous or unhealthy occupations, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL
CHARTER, CONCLUSIONS XI-2, at 59 (1991) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS], or to
provide adequate social and medical assistance. Id. at 119. Similarly, the Committee concluded that states had not fully complied with obligations to issue health
and safety regulations to ensure safe and healthy working conditions for the selfemployed, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS,
CONCLUSIONS XX-1, at 82 (1992); to ensure that children in full-time education
should not be employed in such work as would deprive them of the full benefit of
their education, id. at 136; and to provide adequate social security benefits for
women taking maternity leave, id. at 151. For further examples from the practice
of the Committee, see Scott & Macklem, supra note 81, at 101-05.

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. =X:3

gressive implementation are not entirely open-ended obligations whose interpretation is solely in the hands of the state.8 7
Rather, it has been argued that the performance of such obligations can be monitored. The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights has been in the forefront of this work,
noting for example in its General Comment 188 that the obligations under the Economic Covenant, while permitting in
many cases progressive implementation, also oblige States
Parties to take immediate, identifiable steps in pursuit of the
goals set out in the Economic Covenant. Furthermore, whether
the means chosen to work towards the implementation of a
right are discriminatory is also a justiciable question. 9
The greater recognition given to the positive dimensions of
states' obligations in relation to civil and political rights also
shows that the assessment of whether a state has discharged
its obligations may involve an assessment similar to that required to determine whether a state has carried out its obligations "to take appropriate steps" under the Women's Convention. One example of this is the obligation of due diligence
incumbent on a State Party under customary and conventional
international law to protect individuals against violations of
their human rights by other individuals. In the Veldsquez
Rodriguez case,9" the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held that the obligation of Honduras to ensure the enjoyment

87. The report by the International Human Rights Law Group argues in rela-

tion to articles 2(e) and (f) and the other substantive articles of the Convention
that "it is for States Parties to determine which measures are appropriate to implement the provisions of the Convention." INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW
GROUP, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF U.S.
LAW RELATING TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION 27 (1994).
While correct as stated, the inference cannot be drawn from the materials cited in
the Law Group's report that the question of appropriateness is solely and finally
to be determined by the State Party concerned, and not subject to international
supervision.
88. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 1
(Third Session, 1989): Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 43-45, U.N. Doc.
HRIIGEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
89. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3
(Fifth Session, 1990): Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 5q 2, 5, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1 (1994) [hereinafter General comment 3].
90. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1988).
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of various rights included an obligation:
166.... to organize the governmental apparatus and, in
general, all the structures through which public power is
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the
free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of
this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right
violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages
resulting from the violation of human rights.
174. The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations
committed within its jurisdiction to identify those responsible, impose the appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation. 1
For an international body to evaluate whether a State
Party has organized its governmental apparatus to ensure the
enjoyment of human rights and whether it has taken "reasonable" steps to prevent and punish violations raises complex
issues similar to the type commonly involved in pronouncing
on violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. However,
there does not appear to be much difference between an obligation to take reasonable steps, and an obligation to take "necessary" or "all appropriate" measures to eliminate discrimination
(both of which involve an assessment of what steps are reasonably available to a State Party in its particular circumstances).
Thus, the determination of many civil and political rights may
involve an assessment very similar to that involved in assessing whether a State Party has given effect to an economic,
social, or cultural right. Economic, social, and cultural rights
have no monopoly on factual and legal complexity may be seen
from cases before the Human Rights Committee such as the
Lubicon Lake Band case in which the Committee was required
to consider whether rights guaranteed by the ICCPR had been
violated by a State Party where expropriation of traditional
lands of the Lubicon Lake Band for oil and gas exploration was
causing irreparable injury to the Band by destroying its traditional way of life and means of subsistence and livelihood.92
91. Id.
166, 174.
92. See Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Corn-
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1. The Justiciability of Guarantees of Non-Discrimination
The Women's Convention does not consist of obligations to
ensure the enjoyment of independent rights by women, but
rather obliges States Parties to afford women equality with
men in the enjoyment of rights and to eliminate discrimination
against women. Guarantees of equality and non-discrimination
are widely accepted as justiciable at the international and
national level, although in concrete cases they may give rise to
complex questions of fact and difficult evaluations.
Guarantees of equality and non-discrimination have been
accepted as justiciable in relation both to civil and political
rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights.93 Obligations
of non-discrimination on the basis of race guaranteed under
the Racial Discrimination Convention cover all categories of
rights and are justiciable under the optional individual complaints procedure established by article 14 of that Convention.94 Similarly, the guarantee of equality before the law and
equal protection of the law contained in article 26 of the
ICCPR-which has been held to be an independent guarantee
of equality and non-discrimination extending to economic,
social, and cultural rights-has been accepted as justiciable,95
as is shown by the case law under the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR. 6 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-

munication No. 167/1984, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990). Similarly
complex evidence was before the European Court of Human Rights in Abdulaziz v.
United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985), in which the Court had to decide whether discrimination in UK immigration law and practice was reasonable.
93. See Torkel Opsahl, Equality in Human Rights Law With ParticularReference to Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
FORTSC-IRIT IM BEWUI3TSEIN DER GRUND UND MENSCIENRECHTE 51-67 (Manfred
Nowak et al. eds., 1988); Scott & Macklem, supra note 81; Anne F. Bayefsky, The
Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law, 11 HUm. RTS.
L.J. 1 (1990); SACHA PRECHAL & NOREEN BURROWS, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990).
94. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at
230-32.
95. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
96. Two separate concurring opinions of members of the Human Rights Committee argue that the content of the obligation of non-discrimination in relation to
economic, social and cultural rights may be different than in the case of civil and
political rights. Sprenger v. Netherlands, Communication No. 396/1990, Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 311, U.N.
Doc. A/47/40 (1994); Oulajin & Kaiss v. Netherlands, Communications Nos.
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tural Rights (Economic Committee) has also observed that the
guarantee of the enjoyment of rights without discrimination
contained in article 2(3) of the Economic Covenant "will often
be promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial or other
effective remedies." 7
However, the Convention does not merely provide that a
State Party shall accord women "the right to equality and nondiscrimination" in all areas of public and private life, although
some of its provisions do impose specific obligations of this
sort. Many of the obligations imposed by the Convention involve an obligation to take "appropriate" steps towards the goal
of eliminating discrimination against women. The issue, thus,
is not whether guarantees of non-discrimination are themselves justiciable-as they self-evidently are-but whether
obligations to work towards the elimination of discrimination
are justiciable.
While it must be recognized that obligations to take appropriate measures may be more difficult to monitor than more
precisely circumscribed rights, meaningful scrutiny of a state's
performance in implementing its obligations under the Convention is nevertheless possible." The supervisory body will inevitably have to defer to the state's margin of judgment in determining what is "appropriate" in many cases, but it will be able
to assess at least whether a state has taken the minimum
steps necessary to demonstrate a bona fide fulfillment of its
obligation. This is particularly true considering that the goal of
equality and non-discrimination is not vague or open-ended,
but is itself a justiciable guarantee.

406/1990 and 42611990, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. HI, at 131, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993). Nevertheless,
those members apparently still considered the obligation to be justiciable in relation to economic, social and cultural rights.
5; CRAVEN, supra note 57, at 18197. General Comment 3, supra note 89,
82.
98. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 (requiring
States Parties to take "necessary steps" to ensure the rights guaranteed in the
Covenant). However, the Human Rights Committee has held that complaints that
a state has failed to fulfil its obligations under article 2 cannot be considered in
isolation under the First Optional Protocol. M.G.B. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 26811987, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, at 157, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990); S.E. v. Argentina, Communication No. 27511988, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. I, at 159, U.N. Doc. A145140 (1990).
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Similar deference to the judgment of a state on the appropriateness of measures adopted often forms part of the process
of determining whether a state has infringed upon civil or
political rights traditionally considered justiciable. For example, when determining whether an infringement of a protected
right is permissible under the European Convention on Human
Rights or the ICCPR, the Strasbourg organs and the Human
Rights Committee must determine whether the limitation on a
given right is "necessary" to achieve a particular purpose.9 9
This determination may involve assessing what range of options is reasonably open to a state and whether the option
chosen falls within that range. This is similar to the process of
judging whether the steps taken by a State Party in purported
fulfillment of its obligation to eliminate discrimination against
women are appropriate measures for the achievement of that
goal. In the following section, the major types of obligations
imposed by the Convention are examined, and illustrations are
given of the ways in which the Committee could determine
whether a State Party has given effect to its obligations.
2. The Types of Obligations Imposed by the Convention'
The obligations contained in the Convention are formulated in a number of different ways and these differences in wording can be of considerable legal significance.'
There are
three principal categories of obligation,, formulated as follows:
1) States Parties shall ensure/shall accord/shall grant the
right...
2) States Parties undertake to...
99. In the European Convention on Human Rights context much of this inquiry is carried out under the rubric of the "margin of appreciation," within which
contracting states possess discretion to implement potentially discriminatory policies. The boundaries of this margin are not clear nor fixed, but vary according to
the circumstances, the subject matter and the background. See R. St. J.
MacDonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 83; see also Thomas A. O'Donnell,
The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474 (1982). The Human Rights Committee, however, generally simply asks whether a measure is "necessary"
100. See generally Rebecca Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's
Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 158-69 (1994).
101. See the similar analysis of the differences in wording of the various provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
Alston & Quinn, supra note 81, at 183-86.
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3) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures (in
order to ensure)...
The first category comprises justiciable obligations of the type
seen in classical civil and political rights catalogues. The second type of obligation is, we maintain, also justiciable. The
third category does not fall into the classical civil and political
rights mold, but nonetheless, the obligations imposed are capable of independent external scrutiny, even though they may
provide the State Party with a margin of discretion and judgment in determining what measures are appropriate in the
national context. While these latter types of obligations will no
doubt raise some new interpretive challenges, other international supervisory bodies engage in analogous exercises under
their complaint mechanisms. Accordingly, we argue that a
state's fulfillment of each category of obligations under the
Convention can be meaningfully reviewed.
a. Obligations to Ensure/Accord/Grant a Right
A number of articles of the Convention impose an explicit
obligation on States Parties to ensure, grant, or accord a specific right or guarantee of equality, or to ensure that a particular legal situation obtains within their jurisdiction. They indude:
(a) article 9(1) and (2): "States Parties shall grant women
equal rights with men" in relation to nationality and the
nationality of their children and "shall ensure" that marriage
to a foreigner does not of itself have effects on a woman's
nationality."'
(b) article 15(1), (2), (4): "States Parties shall accord" to
women equality with men before the law, equal legal capacity
to men and the same rights in relation to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose a residence and domicile. 8
(c) article 16(1): "States Parties... in particular shall ensure, on the basis of equality of men and women" that women
have the same rights as men in a number of matters related
to marriage.

102.
phasis
103.
104.

4

Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(1)-(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17 (emadded).
Id. art. 15(1)-(2), (4), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 16(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (emphasis added). The preambular part
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(d) article 7: "States Parties... in particular shall ensure to
women, on the basis of equality of men and women" that
women have the right to vote and to be eligible for election,
to participate in the formulation of government policy, to hold
public office and perform public functions, and to participate
in non-governmental organizations and associations.'
(e) articles 15(3) and 16(2): "States Parties agree that all
contracts... shall be deemed null and void", "[States Parties
have agreed:] [t]he betrothal and marriage of a child shall
have no legal effect .... .""'
All the provisions referred to above mandate that states take
immediate and concrete steps in order to fulfill the obligations.. 7 and are accordingly clearly justiciable. For example,
whether a State Party has accorded women equal rights with
respect to nationality is clearly a justiciable question, answered by determining whether the state has in its laws and
administrative practice conferred those rights. These questions
have been the subject of international and national litiga09
tion.' ° Similarly, the duty to accord equal legal capacity,

of article 16(1) commences with the words: "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations," before going on to specify a number of specific
rights that must be "ensured." Id. (emphasis added). It is a reasonable interpretation of this article that the guarantees of the specific rights mentioned in article
16(1)(a)-(g) are specific ways of achieving that broad goal and that States Parties
have accepted a firmer obligation in relation to those specific rights, as is underlined by the undertaking to "ensure."
105. Id. art. 7, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17 (emphasis added). Although the preambular
part of article 7 commences with the words: "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and
public life of the country," it is a reasonable interpretation that the guaranteeing
of the specific rights mentioned in article 7(a)-(c) are specific ways of achieving
that broad goal and that States Parties have accepted a firmer obligation in relation to those specific rights, as is underlined by the undertaking to "ensure.
106. Id. arts. 15(3), 16(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
107. Cf. Alston & Quinn, supra note 81, at 185-86.
108. See Advisory Opinion 0C-4/84, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, 1984 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 4, 79 I.R.
282 (1984); Unity Dow v. Atty Gen. of Botswana, [1992]
L.R.C. 623 (Ct. App.) (Bots.); Rattigan v. Chief Immigration Officer of Zimbabwe,
[1994] 1 L.R.C. 343 (Zimb.); Salem v. Chief Immigration Officer of Zimbabwe,
[19941 1 L.R.C. 354 (Zimb).
109. Avellanal v. Peru, Communication No. 202/1986, Report of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. GAO,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 196, U.N. Dc.
A/44/40 (1989) (same formal legal rights to legal personality).
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the equal right to choose a residence, and the equal right to
choose a domicile are also justiciable.
The obligations under article 7(a) requiring States Parties
to ensure that women have the right, on equal terms with
men, to vote in elections and public referenda and to be eligible
for election to all publicly elected bodies are also clearly justiciable. While the first part of article 7(b), requiring equal participation in the formulation and implementation of government policy, appears vague, it is comparable with article 25(a)
of the ICCPR which guarantees the right to take part "in the
conduct of public affairs.""0 The second part of article 7(b),
obliging States Parties to ensure that women have equal rights
with men to perform all public functions at all levels of government, is relatively clear and, thus, it should be possible to
identify the scope of activities and offices encompassed by
paragraph 7(b). The same is true for article 7(c), which ensures
equality of opportunity in NGO participation and other public
and political associations.
The obligation under article 16(1) to ensure equal rights in
relation to marriage and the family is also justiciable. Each of
the relevant rights in paragraphs (a) to (g) is specified with
reasonable precision, and it should be possible to determine
whether a state has in fact ensured that right, whether by
legislation, case law or other ways."' The recent detailed
treatment afforded these articles by CEDAW in its General
Recommendation 21 shows that the obligations, far from being
open-ended, can be concretized easily, even though an assessment of what is discriminatory may be contentious."'
The rights guaranteed in article 15(3) and the first part of

110. ICCPI, supra note 10, art. 25(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
111. The specific rights mentioned in article 16(1)(a)-(g) are very similar to the

matters mentioned by the Human Rights Committee in its general comment relating to article 23 of the ICCPR, which provides in article 23(4) that States Parties
shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities in
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. General Comment No. 19 (39):
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
175, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990). Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights covers substantially the same ground as article 16 of
the Convention. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1984, Proto-

col No. 7, Europ. T.S. No. 117.
112. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994).
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article 16(2) are also justiciable." 3 If the legal situation in a
State Party is not already in conformity with the Convention's
requirements, then a state must take steps to amend its law to
ensure that the contracts referred to in article 15(3) and child
betrothal and child marriage have no effect under national
law. Whether this has been done can be verified by an examination of national legislation, case law, and practice.
b. Obligations of Undertaking to...
A second group of provisions, largely found in article 2 of
the Convention,". also imposes on States Parties obligations
to take specific types of action; whether a state has in fact
fulfilled those obligations would appear to be a justiciable
question.
Under article 2(a), States Parties "undertake" to:
(a) ... [1] embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate

legislation if not yet incorporated therein and [2] to ensure,
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle." 5
The first part of this paragraph gives rise to few difficulties
when it comes to assessing compliance: a state must be able to
point to a provision in its constitution, to a general anti-discrimination law, or to some other form of legal guarantee of
the principle of equality (as many states have done in their
reports under article 18 of the Convention). The second part of
the paragraph emphasizes that the formal guarantees of equality must actually be enjoyed in practice, also an obligation the
performance of which can be assessed by reference to specific
criteria." 6
113. Women's Convention, supra note 3, arts. 15(3), 16(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20.
114. See generally Implementation of Article 21 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Analysis of Article 2 of the
Convention, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 14th
Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1995/4 (1994) [hereinafter Article 2
Analysis], which sets out in detail under each paragraph of article 2 the type of
actions taken by States Parties and recommended by the Committee which would
contribute to the fulfillment of the obligations accepted under the article.
115. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16 (emphasis
added).
116. See Article 2 Analysis, supra note 114, 91 16-27.
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Paragraphs 2(b) and (c)" require the adoption of appropriate legislative and other measures prohibiting discrimination and the establishment of effective remedies for any act of
discrimination." 8 While the exact content of legislation and
the institutional and remedial arrangements will depend on
the situation in the State Party concerned, it is clear that some
legislation must be adopted which prohibits discrimination and
provides remedies which can reasonably be viewed as being
accessible and effective." 9 A failure to enact such legislation,
or a patently ineffectual system of implementation, would
amount to failure on the part of the State Party to carry out its
obligations under these provisions. If a state has enacted such
legislation and there is in place a functioning, though perhaps
not optimal, system of enforcement, it seems likely that a supervisory body would hold that the steps taken by the state
satisfy its minimum obligation. The exact form these steps
took would fall within the state's margin of discretion. Paragraph 2(b) is analogous to article 2(1)(d) of the Racial Discrimination Convention, 2 ' while paragraph 2(c) is analogous to
article 6 of the same Convention.' Both these articles are
amenable to individual complaints under procedures established by article 14 of that Convention. Accordingly, paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) can be equally viewed as justiciable. 1"
Paragraph 2(d) of the Convention, which requires a State
Party to "refrain from engaging in any act or practice of dis-

117. The text of article 2(b) and (c) provides that State Parties "undertake":
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other
public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of
discrimination.
Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(b)-(c), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16.
28-55.
118. See Article 2 Analysis, supra note 114,
119. See Alston & Quinn, supra note 81, at 165-72.
120. See Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(1)(d), 660
U.N.T.S. at 218.
121. See id. art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
122. See Yilmaz-Dogan v. Netherlands, Communication No. 111984, Report of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess.,
Supp. No. 18, Annex IV, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/43118 (1988); L.K. v. Netherlands,
Communication No. 4/1991, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex IV, at 130, U.N. Doc. A148/18
(1993) (failure to fulfill obligation under article 6).
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crimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation,'
is in essence a statement of a state's obligation to
"respect" a particular right, in this case the right to be free
from discrimination at the hands of state authorities. Paragraph 2(d) has a counterpart in article 2(1)(a) of the Racial
Discrimination Convention,"2 a provision which is subject to
that Convention's individual complaints procedure. The substantive content of paragraph 2(d) is also much the same as
articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR,1 6 generally considered to
be justiciable obligations of immediate effect. Consequently,
paragraph 2(d) can reasonably be viewed as a justiciable obligation.
Paragraph 2(g), which requires States Parties to repeal all
national penal provisions which constitute discrimination
against women, is also phrased in terms which make it a justiciable obligation of immediate effect, in that the continued
existence of discriminatory statutes is something that can be
readily evaluated in most cases. 7 Thus, five of the seven
paragraphs of article 2, a central provision of the Convention,

123. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(d), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16.
124. See Article 2 Analysis, supra note 114, J% 56-59.
125. Article 2(1)(a) of the Racial Discrimination Convention provides that:
Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial
discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and
local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.
Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(1)(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
126. ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179. Article 2
provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect to en-

sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any

kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national, or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. Article 26 provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-

crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and

effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.

Id.
127. See Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(g), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16;
Article 2 Analysis, supra note 114,

% 81-89.
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are justiciable obligations in a traditional sense, and have
direct parallels or analogous provisions in other U.N. treaties
which are subject to individual complaint procedures." 2
The first part of article 14(1) of the Convention requires
States Parties to "take into account the particular problems
faced by rural women and the significant roles which rural
women play in the economic survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy."'29 A state's minimum level of performance with regard
to this obligation could be assessed, for example, by examining
whether efforts have been made to determine the particular
needs of rural women and to address these needs through
policies which affect the rural population. Article 14(2), providing that States Parties shall "ensure" to rural women a number of rights and benefits, gives the scope of the obligation in
article 14(1) greater focus."' Consequently, article 14(2) allows at least an assessment of whether the State Party has
performed the obligation at a minimum level and thus whether

128. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of paragraph 2(e).
129. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19.
130. Article 14(2) provides that:
2. States Parties shall take all appropriatemeasures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from
rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the
right:
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development
planning at all levels;
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counseling and services in family planning;
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes;
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal or non-formal,
including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the
benefit of all community and extension services, in order to increase their
technical proficiency;,
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal
access to economic opportunities through employment or self-employment;
(f) To participate in all community activities;
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities,
appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform
as well as in land resettlement schemes;
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.
Id. art. 14(2)(a)-(h), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
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the state has ensured the rights, benefits, or opportunities
specified.
c. Obligations to Take all Appropriate Measures (in order to
ensure)...
Unlike the obligations discussed above, a number of the
other provisions in the Convention require that State Parties
"take all appropriate measures" to ensure the rights delineated. Insofar as these obligations are concerned, it may be argued that States Parties have been left with so much discretion to determine the means appropriate to eliminate discrimination in the specific fields covered by those articles, that it is
impracticable for a independent quasi-judicial body to assess,
by means of a communications procedure of the types proposed, whether States Parties have complied with those obligations.
3. Justiciability of Obligations "to take all appropriate
measures"
Nevertheless, the view that an obligation to take appropriate steps (sometimes equated, not entirely accurately, with an
obligation of progressive implementation) is not justiciable has
come under increasing criticism.'' An obligation to take appropriate measures to achieve a goal has been characterized as
an obligation of result rather than an obligation of means or
conduct. However, this characterization does not necessarily
mean that steps taken by the state concerned to achieve the
specified goal are wholly within the discretion of that state.
This issue has been examined in some detail by the Economic
Committee, generally, and in relation to the possible adoption
of an individual complaints procedure under the Economic
Covenant. The Economic Committee has expressed the view
that, although the obligation to take appropriate steps may not
require a State Party to bring about the full enjoyment of a
guaranteed right immediately, a good faith interpretation of
such an obligation means that some steps must be taken immediately. These include, for example, steps to establish the

131. For a lucid discussion of the issues, arguing that many economic, social
and cultural rights are in fact justiciable, see Scott & Macklem, supra note 81, at
72-114.
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extent and causes of a problem, the development of a plan of
action to address the problem, and the establishment of goals
and targets which permit the measurement of progress over
time.132 The Economic Committee has also stated that "the
ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate measures
have been taken remains one for the Committee to make.""
Most of the obligations to take all appropriate steps or
measures under the Convention can be subjected to the same
analysis, with the result that the Committee would be in a
position to assess at least whether a State Party had taken the
minimum steps necessary for it to carry out its obligation in
good faith. In this context, the general recommendations adopted by the Committee may also contribute to the more precise
definition of the steps that a state must take in order to give
effect to its obligations.
4. The Different Types of Obligations to Take all Appropriate
Measures
There are slight variations in wording within this category
of obligations, but in general the obligation is that the State
Party agrees that it "shall take all appropriate measures" to
eliminate discrimination against women or to ensure particular
rights on the basis of equality of women and men.
a. Obligations to "take all appropriate measures" to Achieve a
Specified Goal, Without Further Qualification
A number of provisions simply provide that States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to achieve a specified objective with no further elaboration of the detailed goals that
might contribute to the achievement of that objective. Article 6,
for example, requires a State Party to take all appropriate
measures to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of women.'34 A State Party which does not have legislation in place which makes trafficking in women and exploita-

132. See General Comment 3, supra note 89, J 2; General Comment 6, Comm.
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13th Sess.,
18, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1995/16 (1995); Alston & Quinn, supra note 81, at 166-72.
133. General Comment 3, supra note 89, q 4.
134. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17. Paragraphs 2(e) and 2(f) also fall into this category.
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tion of the prostitution of women a criminal offense would, in

our view, have failed to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. In addition, one could also require that the state take
reasonable steps towards the actual enforcement of those laws;
a failure to take such measures would also constitute a failure
to fulfill the obligation imposed by article 6.135
Article 8 requires States Parties to take all appropriate
measures to ensure to women the opportunity to represent
their government at the international level and to participate
in the work of international organizations."' 5 Assessing
whether a state has done this would involve evaluating the
distribution of women within the foreign service and other
international departments, determining whether there are
formal guarantees of equal opportunity in employment in these
fields of employment and whether they are effective in practice, and evaluating the record of a State Party in nominating
women to positions in international organizations. Such matters are justiciable and, indeed, have been litigated at the
national level. 7
Article 12, obliging States Parties to take all appropriate
steps to eliminate discrimination in the field of health care in
order to ensure women's equal access to health services and
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, also contains obligations which are capable of meaningful review.'
The right to health, traditionally viewed as a social right requiring progressive implementation, has been the subject of
sustained examination to assess its detailed content and also
to concretize the obligation of states under the Economic Covenant as well as other instruments which guarantee the right to
health.'39 Considerable attention has been focused on dis135. See generally Analysis of Article 6 (and Other Articles Relating to Violence
Towards Women and the Sexual Harassment and Sexual Exploitation of Women) of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 11th
Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/4 (1992).
136. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 8, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
137. See, e.g., Secretary of the Dep't of Foreign Affairs & Trade v. Styles,
[1989] EOC 9 92 (Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia) (challenge to overseas posting decision by foreign service).
138. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 12, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19.
139. For an overview, see Virginia A. Leary, The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 24 (1994); Lucie Bernier, A
Selected Bibliography of Human Rights and the Right to Health, 1 HEALTH &
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crimination against women in the context of the right to

health. This attention has generated a large body of work
which suggests that not only is it possible to identify patterns
of discrimination against women in the field of health, 40 but
it is also practicable to identify the steps states reasonably can
be expected to take to eliminate such discrimination, and to
assess whether a state is in a position to take those steps.'
b. Obligations to "take all appropriate measures,"
accompanied by Explicit Obligations to "ensure" Rights
A number of provisions contain a general obligation to

take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination and
then go on to require States Parties to "ensure" specific rights
(for example, articles 7 and 16). As argued above, this latter
obligation is justiciable. However, the former, more general
obligation may be problematic. It is clearly inclusive of the
obligation to guarantee the rights specified in the rest of the

article, but is broader. Nevertheless, while such an obligation
may appear open-ended, it should still be possible to demand
and measure a minimal level of performance, including at least
an assessment of the extent of discrimination and its causes,
and the adoption by a State Party of a plan to address the

discrimination.

HUM. RTS. 110 (1994). That the right to health can be justiciable may be seen
from the decision of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in the case
brought by the Yanomami Indians against Brazil, in which the Commission held
that acts and omissions of the government had violated (among other rights) the
right of the petitioners to the preservation of their health guaranteed by article 11
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Case 7615, InterAm. C.H.R. 24, OEA/ser. LJV/II.66 doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985). The Open Door Counselling case, brought under article 10 of the European Convention claiming a violation of the right to freedom of expression, could equally well have been analyzed
as a violation of article 10 of the Women's Convention, if such a guarantee had
been amenable to a complaints procedure. Open Door Counselling & Dublin Well
Woman Centre v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
140. See generally Rebecca Cook, Human Rights in Relation to Women's Health:
The Promotion and Protection of Women's Health Through International Human
Rights Law, at 25-30, WHO Doc. WHO/DGH/93.1 (1993); Audrey R. Chapman,
Monitoring Women's Right to Health Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1157, 1168-75 (1995).
141. Cook, supra note 140, at 17-23.
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c. Obligations to "take all appropriate measures" in Order to
Ensure in Particular Specified Goals of the Enjoyment of
Specified Rights
A number of articles provide that a State Party shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination in a particular field generally, but then go on to specify a number of
specific equality goals within that area. For example, article 10
requires that States Parties take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure
equal rights with men in the field of education and, in particular, to ensure the same opportunities in areas such as curricula and access to scholarships."' Article 11, dealing with employment, is structured in a similar way.'
The specification of particular goals in articles 10(a)-(h) as
well as 11(1) and (2) means that there are identified criteria
against which the implementation of the general obligation can
be assessed. While the general obligation to eliminate discrimination in relation to education or employment may require
more than achieving the specific goals stated, these clearly
constitute the central core of the obligation. Many of the goals
specified in both articles 10 and 11 are capable of supervision.
The minimal content of the obligation would be to ascertain
the extent of any discrimination faced by women in the field of
education or employment, followed by the adoption of a detailed policy to address the causes of this discrimination. 4 '
For example, whether women have the same opportunities
to benefit from scholarships or have access to the same curricula is a question capable of judicial determination and has
been the subject of litigation in some countries. It should also
142. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17-18.
143. Id. art. 11, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18-19.
144. Compare the comments of Melchior, who considers that the right to work

could be subjected to the complaints procedure of the European Convention:
[Tihis right may be considered and even defined as implying that the
State is under an obligation to set up a minimum number of mechanisms
to ensure the practical realization of the right: this might entail, for
example, a placement system, matching employment vacancies with demand, a system of vocational guidance and training. In the case of individual applications the judicial supervisory body might ascertain whether
such mechanisms exist, or might even examine, at a later stage, whether
they are appropriate, and later still whether they are really effective.
Michel Melchior, Rights Not Covered by the Convention, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTs, supra note 78, at 593, 599.
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be possible to determine whether appropriate steps to reduce
female drop-out rates at all levels of education have been taken. For example, a State Party may be asked whether it has
identified the drop-out rate and its causes, whether any steps
have been taken to address these issues, and whether they
have had any impact. Obligations that appear more imprecise,
such as paragraphs 10(c) and (h),"' would also be capable of
monitoring by the use of this type of approach.
In the case of employment, some of the specified goals are
similar or identical to those that are already subject to judicial
supervision at the national level or to complaints procedures at
the international level. For example, article 2 of ILO Convention No. 111 on Discrimination in Occupation and Employment, obliges contracting states to "declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to
national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and
treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a
view to eliminating any discrimination in any aspect thereof."4 Other matters dealt with in article 11 are also covered
by ILO conventions, for example the right to equal remuneration for work of equal value (ILO No. 100)14 and the adoption of measures to allow women and men to combine their
family and work responsibilities (ILO No. 156)." All these
ILO Conventions are subject to the various complaints procedures available under the ILO Constitution, and the nature

145. Paragraph 10(c) states that States Parties shall "ensure":
The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation
and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in
particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the
adaption of teaching methods.
Women's Convention, supra note 3, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18. Paragraph 10(h) adds
that States Parties shall "ensure . . . [a]ccess to specific educational information to
help ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice
on family planning." Id. art. 10(h), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18.
146. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO Convention No. 111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, 34 (entered
into force June 15, 1960).
147. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers
for Work of Equal Value (ILO Convention No. 100), adopted June 29, 1951, 165
U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953).
148. Convention Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men
and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities (ILO Convention No.
156), adopted June 23, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force Aug. 11, 1983).
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and extent of the obligations under them are also considered in
detail by the Committee of Experts
on the Application of Con149
ventions and Recommendations.

Article 13, which obliges States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure equality in access to various economic and social benefits also admits of external scrutiny. 150
For example, ensuring equal rights to family benefits involves
appropriate legislative and administrative measures on the
part of the state. Equal access to credit needs both legislative
and administrative support from government in order to ensure de facto as well as de jure access. The right to participate
on an equal basis in recreational activities, sports, and all
aspects of cultural life requires that a state must, at a minimum, ascertain whether men's and women's access to such
activities is unequal and adopt a strategy to address any inequality.
Articles 3 and 24 of the Convention are the most broadly
stated of the obligations to take appropriate or necessary measures.' They appear to add little, if anything, substantive to
the more specific provisions of the Convention. Conceivably,
there may be areas not explicitly covered by the other provisions, in which case it would be necessary to rely on article 3
or 24. An example might be discrimination against women in
the enjoyment of one of the human rights incorporated in the
Convention by reference to the definition of discrimination in
article 1. In such a case, however, the analysis applied above
would still be applicable, although what a State Party would
have to do to satisfy its obligation may be relatively modest.

149. See, e.g., Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Equality in Employment and Occupation: General Survey of the Reports on the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111)

and Recommendation (No. 111), Int'l Labour Conf., 75th Sass., Agenda Item 3 (International Labour Office 1988).
150. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19.
151. Id. arts. 3, 24, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16, 22.
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5. Conclusion
While the process of assessing whether a State Party has
complied with its obligations under the Convention may pose
greater difficulties than the similar task under the ICCPR,
concerns about the justiciability of the obligations contained in
the Convention should not be overemphasized. The Convention
contains a number of obligations which are clearly justiciable,
and even in the case of obligations to take all appropriate
measures, it would be possible for the Committee to exercise a
meaningful level of scrutiny over steps taken by States Parties
to achieve the stated goals. Furthermore, as the Economic
Committee has observed, one of the most effective ways to give
detailed content to obligations that may not look justiciable is
to subject them to a procedure in which they must be the subject of judicial interpretation. 5 ' Perhaps the real issue regarding the justiciability of obligations created by the Convention is whether a disproportionate number of complaints will
concern those Convention obligations which are less precise
and which allow the state a wide margin of discretion to determine appropriate action. If such complaints do dominate, they
are likely to be prolonged and contentious. Consequently, their
resolution may contribute little to achieving the underlying
aims of the Convention.
In any event, it is not essential for all provisions of a treaty to be justiciable for it to be the subject of a complaints procedure. National courts in jurisdictions where the complete
text of treaties becomes part of domestic law, whether as a
result of a constitutional provision or by the promulgation or
adoption of the text by executive or legislative act, have been
prepared to apply those parts of a treaty which are held to be

152. Compare Tardu, who observes that:
Experience of the procedures under articles 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution and the ILO freedom of association procedure has shown that it is
possible for a quasi-judicial body to reach a finding on the will of States
to implement progressive clauses such as those of the International Cove-

nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as on their conduct with regard to the immediately applicable International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
Maxime Tardu, The Effectiveness of United Nations Methods and Mechanisms in
the Field of Human Rights: A Critical Overview, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 5, addendum,
125, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/PC/60/Add.5
(1993).
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capable of application to particular cases, while at the same
time holding that other parts of the treaty cannot be applied.153 Accordingly, it would be possible, in the resolution of
complaints under the proposed protocol, to apply only those
parts of the Convention considered justiciable.
B. The Application of the Convention in Respect to the Acts of
Private Persons
Concerns relating to the justiciability of obligations contained in the Convention are likely to dominate discussion of
the feasibility of any optional protocol allowing complaints.
Among other concerns that may be raised is the appropriateness of a communications procedure under the Convention
given that many of the serious violations of women's human
rights are carried out by private individuals. The international
legal principles regarding state responsibility are primarily
concerned with the accountability of states for their own activities and those of their agents, with activities of private individuals rarely engaging such responsibility. A procedure allowing
for communications relating to obligations in the Convention
will, inevitably, focus on state, rather than individual, action.
Further, although it is important to recognize that many of the
violations of women's human rights occur at the hands of individuals, such recognition should not distract attention from
violations by the state. States violate the human rights of
women directly and, by maintaining discriminatory laws and
practices, also violate these rights by way of discrimina1
tion. 5
Nor should the fact that many of the important forms of

153. See, for example, the decision of the Central Appeals Court of the Netherlands on article 7(a)(i) of the Economic Covenant, 19 NETH. Y.B. N'L L. 427, 429
(1988) (holding that, although most of the rights in the Covenant did not have

direct effect as part of Netherlands law "it would be wrong to assume that a provision such as Article 7(a)(i) can never as a matter of principle have direct effect").
Cf Iwasawa, supra note 79, at 50. See also the decisions of other Dutch courts
accepting that article 6(4) of the European Social Charter can be given direct

effect, although other provisions might not be held directly applicable. Lammy
Betten & Teun Jaspers, The Netherlands, in 25 YEARS EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER
131, 133-34 (A. Ph. C. M. Jaspers & L. Betten eds., 1988).
154. Dorothy Q. Thomas, Acting Unnaturally: In Defense of the Civil and Political Rights of Women, in FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS: WOMEN'S CLAMIS
TO HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (Margaret A. Schuler ed., 1995).
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discrimination against women are carried out by private actors
lead to the conclusion that a complaints procedure is inappropriate in the context of the Convention. The nature of the responsibility of the state is somewhat different under general
human rights law when a violation is committed by a private
individual than it is when the violation is directly attributable
to the state.'55 In the case of private acts, the state's international responsibility is generally only engaged if it has failed to
take adequate preventive, remedial, punitive or compensatory
measures. However, state responsibility arising out of the acts
of private individuals is a well-established area of international law having its origins in the body of law dealing with injuries to aliens. In the context of the general obligations to ensure the enjoyment of human rights, issues of state responsibility where nonstate actors have committed human rights
violations have been considered with increasing frequency in
recent years by international human rights bodies. 5
The Women's Convention provides explicitly in article 2
that States Parties are under an obligation to take appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination by any person, including
private persons."H The addition of an optional complaints
procedure would inevitably lead to claims that by failing to
prevent, punish, or remedy discrimination by a private person
or organization, a State Party had failed to take appropriate
measures within the meaning of article 2(e) to eliminate discrimination by any person, organization or enterprise. Article
2(1)(a) of the Racial Discrimination Convention,'
obliging
each State Party to prohibit and bring to an end, by legislation
and other means, racial discrimination by any persons, group
or organization, is similar to article 2(e) of the Women's Con-

155. See Clapham, supra note 84, at 188-244; TOM ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS: THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 87-94, 99-109 (1994); Andrew
Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human Rights Law - Methodological
Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalisation?:Some Current Issues,
12 AuSTL. Y.B. INTVL L. 205, 225-39 (1992).
156. See, e.g., Velsquez Rodrfguez Case, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1988);
X. & Y. v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) (1985); L.K. v Netherlands, Conmunication No. 4/1991, supra note 122; Cook, supra note 100.
157. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 2, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16.
158. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(a)(1), 660 U.N.T.S.
at 16.
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vention, and this provision has been the subject of decisions by
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) under that Convention's international complaints
procedure.'59 In short, there is no conceptual or legal reason
why the question of state responsibility arising out of discrimination by private persons or bodies should not be within the
scope of a communications procedure.
Similarly, arguments suggesting that the obligations of the
Convention do not lend themselves to any form of complaints
mechanism because they concern "social issues," "private life"
or relate to issues of "custom," "religion" or "culture' may be
raised both as objections to the very idea of a complaints mechanism or to limit its purview to selected articles of the Convention. A large proportion of the Convention's provisions-for
example those in articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15-are
concerned exclusively or primarily with "public" life, with only
a minority concerning the "private" sphere. So far as this latter
category of obligations is concerned, subject to any valid reservations they have entered in this regard, States Parties to the
Convention have already accepted legal obligations in respect
of the "private' sphere, as well as with respect to customary,
religious and cultural practices. An additional optional mechanism for oversight and enforcement of legal obligations already
accepted in these areas should not be problematic. In any
event, recent consensual expressions of the member states of
the United Nations, such as the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, declare the duty of all states, regardless
of their political, economic, and cultural systems to promote
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.6
These expressions stress the importance of the eradication of
any conflicts which may arise between the rights of women
and the harmful effects of certain traditional, customary practices, and cultural practices as well as religious extremism. 6 '
In addition, article 4 of the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence against Women obliges states to condemn violence
against women and not to invoke custom, religion, or culture to
limit their obligations with respect to its elimination.'62 Like159. L.K v Netherlands, Communication No. 4/1991, supra note 122.
160. Vienna Declaration, supra note 31, % 5.

161. Id. 9 38.
162. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, GA. Res. 104,
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wise, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action requires
states to prohibit and eliminate any harmful aspect of traditional or customary practices. 63 These above agreements render arguments which seek to limit the impact of agreed treaty
obligations in areas affected by custom, religion or culture or
within private and social life unpersuasive.
C. Reservations
As is well known, the Women's Convention is subject to a
large number of reservations, many of them substantive and
broad in scope."' Some of these reservations appear to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and
therefore impermissible under article 28(2).165 Indeed, some
States Parties have objected to them onthis ground. However,
unlike the Racial Discrimination Convention, article 20(2) of
which provides that a reservation shall be considered incompatible if at least two-thirds of States Parties object,'6 6 the
only procedure provided for under the Convention is article
29(1),167 which provides for reference of any dispute over the
application or interpretation of the Convention to the International Court of Justice. As already noted, this provision is the
subject of a large number of reservations-many by States Parties which have entered arguably impermissible reservations to
other provisions-and seems unlikely to provide an avenue for
the resolution of questions of the incompatibility of reservations.
On the question of whether a supervisory body has the
competence to pronounce authoritatively on a reservation's
validity, there are differing international practices. Under the
European Convention, the European Commission of Human

U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doe. A148/49 (1994).
224.
163. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 48,
164. See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990); Belinda
Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1991); LIESBErH LI NzAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN?. 298-370 (1995).
165. Article 28(2) provides that: "[a] reservation incompatible with the object
and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted." Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 28(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
166. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 660 U.N.T.S. at 236.
167. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 29(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
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Rights (European Commission) has taken the view that it can
express an opinion on whether a reservation is consistent with
article 64 of the European Convention, which requires that
"general" reservations not be made and that any reservation be
168
accompanied by a brief statement of the law concerned.
Further, if the European Commission considers that the reservation is invalid, it may then go on to consider the substantive
claim under the European Convention, disregarding the reservation.'69
By contrast, the view that has generally been taken within
the U.N. system is that a treaty body does not have the power
to declare a reservation inconsistent with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty.'1 ° This view, originally articulated in response to a request by the CERD"7' for clarification in
response to its powers in relation to reservations, has been
repeated in response to similar requests by CEDAW'72 and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 73 While these
opinions have been provided in relation to the reporting procedure, it is not clear whether the same applies in relation to a
communications procedure. The difficulty here is if the Committee determines that a reservation covering the subject matter of a complaint is invalid, does it have the power to declare
this reservation invalid and then proceed to consider the com-

168. See, e.g., Temeltasch v. Switzerland, App. No. 9116/80, 31 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 120, 127-29 (1983).
169. See, e.g., Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1988).
170. See Fausto Pocar, Enhancing the Universal Application of Human Rights
Standards and Instruments, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th Sess. of Prep. Comm.,
Agenda Item 5, addendum,
26-35, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157PC/60/Add.4 (1993).
171. LIJNZAAD, supra note 164, at 139.
172. An opinion provided to the CEDAW at its third session by the Treaty
Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs stated:
[U]nder article 21, the Committee is to report annually to the General
Assembly on its activities and "may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received

from the States Parties." Thus, the functions of the Committee do not
appear to include a determination of the incompatibility of reservations,
although reservations undoubtedly affect the application of the Convention and the Committee might have to comment thereon in its reports in
this context.
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on
its Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 45, Annex III, vol. II, % 2(d),
U.N. Doc. A/39/45 (1984).
173. Pocar, supra note 170,
32.
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plaint on the merits, or is it bound to accept the reservation as
barring further inquiry?
Until recently, the practice of the Human Rights Committee suggested that it did not consider it had the competence to
declare a reservation invalid and then proceed to consider the
merits of a complaint after severing the reservation. This consideration was based on the reasoning that, despite the invalidity of the reservation, the State Party would still have become a party to the treaty. Rather, discussion in the Committee had focused on the question of how to approach the consideration of a complaint which is covered by a statement designated as an "interpretive declaration."
In November 1994, however, the Human Rights Committee adopted a general comment on the question of reservations
to the ICCPR which appears to foresee a more active role for
itself.1 4 After noting that many of the traditional rules relating to reservations were based on a model of mutual exchange
and benefit between contracting states that was not appropriate to human rights treaties, the Committee commented:
18. It necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and
purpose of the Covenant. This is in part because, as indicated
above, it is an inappropriate task for States Parties in relation to human rights treaties, and in part because it is a task
that the Committee cannot avoid in the performance of its
functions. In order to know the scope of its duty to examine a
state's compliance under article 40 or a communication under
the first Optional Protocol, the Committee has necessarily to
take a view on the compatibility of a reservation with the
object and purpose of the Covenant and with general international law. Because of the special character of a human rights
treaty, the compatibility of a reservation with the object and
purpose of the Covenant must be established objectively, by
reference to legal principles, and the Committee is particularly well placed to perform this task. The normal consequence
of an unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will
not be in effect at all for a reserving party. Rather, such a

174. General Comment No. 24 (52): Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex V, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).

CEDAW "noted with approval" in General Comment 24(52) that "it may be up to
the Committee itself to make this determination [of incompatibility of reservations]." CEDAW World Conference Report, supra note 53, q 53.

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. MXI3

reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the
Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without
benefit of the reservation.
19. Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that
the Committee, those under the jurisdiction of the reserving
state and other states parties may be clear as to what obligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken. Reservations may thus not be general, but must
refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in
precise terms its scope in relation thereto. When considering
the compatibility of possible reservations with the object and
purpose of the Covenant, states should also take into consideration the overall effect of a group of reservations, as well
as the effect of each reservation on the integrity of the Covenant, which remains an essential consideration. States
should not enter so many reservations that they are in effect
accepting a limited number of human rights obligations, and
not the Covenant as such. So that reservations do not lead to
a perpetual non-attainment of international human rights
standards, reservations should not systematically reduce the
obligations undertaken only to those presently existing in
less demanding standards of domestic law. Nor should interpretative declarations or reservations seek to remove an
autonomous meaning to Covenant obligations, by pronouncing them to be identical, or to be accepted only insofar as
they are identical, with existing provisions of domestic law.
States should not seek through reservations or interpretative
declarations to determine that the meaning of a provision of
the Covenant is the .same as that
given by an organ of any
175
other international treaty body.

175. Id.
18-19 (emphasis added). The views of the Human Rights Committee
expressed in General Comment 24 (52) have proved controversial, with the Legal
Adviser of the United States Department of State suggesting that some aspects of
the Committee's position on the reservations, while interesting, runs contrary to
the Covenant scheme and international law. Particular exception is taken by the
Legal Adviser to paragraph 18, where the Committee suggests that reservations
which the Committee deems invalid "will generally be severable, in the sense that
the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation," which he argues is at odds with the regime established in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Report of the Human Rights Committee: Observations of States Parties Under 40, Paragraph 5, of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, at 134-35, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995). Observa-

tions by the United Kingdom on the General Comment similarly take exception to
the view that an unacceptable reservation will generally be severable and the
Covenant be operative for the reserving party as if the reservation had not been
entered. While the United Kingdom considers severability of a kind may well be a
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However, while the Human Rights Committee has on
many occasions considered the effect of reservations under the
Optional Protocol,176 it does not appear to have had the opportunity to consider a reservation challenged by the complainant on the ground of incompatibility with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Under the Maastricht draft, the issue of the Committee's
powers in relation to reservations to the Convention is not
explicitly addressed.177 Thus, it does not provide any guidance as to whether the Committee could proceed to hear a case
falling within the substantive scope of a reservation where the
Committee considered that the reservation was invalid on the
ground of incompatibility with the object and purpose of the
Convention. While CEDAW itself has expressed clear views on
the incompatibility of some types of reservations with the object and purpose of the Convention,1 8 CEDAW would no
solution in this context, it would entail severance of both the reservation and
parts of the treaty to which it applies on the basis that to proceed otherwise
would entail binding the reserving state to obligations which it had expressly rejected. Id. at 138-39.
176. For a detailed (and critical) assessment of the work of the Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol in relation to reservations, see LIJNZAAD,
supra note 164, at 280-91, 295-97.
177. Article 20 of the Maastricht draft provides that no reservations to the
protocol are permissible. See infra appendix.
178. CEDAW has stated that:
Each State Party that has entered substantive reservations to the
Convention should include information on them in each of its periodic
reports.
In reporting on reservations, the State Party should indicate why
it considered the reservation to be necessary and whether reservations
the State Party may or may not have entered on obligations with regard
to the same right in other conventions are consistent with the reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as the precise effect of the reservation in
terms of national law and policy. It should indicate the plans that it has
to limit the effect of reservations and ultimately withdraw them and,
whenever possible, specify a timetable for withdrawing them.
States Parties which have entered general reservations that do not
refer to a specific article of the Convention or reservations to articles 2
and 3 should make a particular effort to report on the effect and interpretation of them. The Committee considers these to be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the present Convention.
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in its
Thirteenth Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 13, U.N. Doe. A/49/38
(1994) [hereinafter CEDAW 1994 Report]. These views are now incorporated in the
Committee's guidelines for the content of States Parties' reports. Guidelines Re-
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doubt be guided by the experience of the Human Rights Committee in dealing with such a case.
In the case of reservations deemed compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention, it is again likely that
CEDAW would follow the approach adopted by the Human
Rights Committee. Thus, the Committee would first consider
whether the reservation applied to the subject matter of the
communication. If it did, then the Committee would not be
empowered to proceed further with its consideration of the
communication.
If the Committee considered that it did have the power to
pronounce on the compatibility of reservations with the object
and purpose of the Convention, presumably it would then have
to consider the consequences of that invalidity. For example,
the Committee would have to determine whether the State
Party's ratification of the Convention was effective without the
reservation (along the lines proposed by the Human Rights
Committee) or whether the impermissible reservation could not
be severed from the ratification. Some assistance in this regard
may be derived from the practice of the States Parties to the
Convention. While a number of States Parties have objected to
some reservations as being incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention, these objecting states have not
stated that this prevents the Convention from entering into
force as between the states concerned. Indeed, on various occasions they have expressly stated the contrary.'79
V. OBLIGATIONS SUBJECT TO THE PROCEDURES

One issue which is raised in the context of any complaints
procedure to a human rights treaty is whether such a procedure should be applicable to all the obligations created by the
treaty, or whether the procedure should apply to selected nominated obligations only. In the following section, we consider
this issue in the context of both the individual complaints
procedure, created in Part I of the draft protocol and the inquiry procedure, created in Part II.
garding the Form and Content of Initial Reports of States Parties, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 14th Sess., U.N. Doe.
CEDAW/C/7IRev.1 (1995).
179. See, e.g., REHOF, supra note 5, at 276-81 (objections made by Finland,
Germany, Mexico and the Netherlands).
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A. Individual Complaints Procedure
A number of options are available when considering the
substantive scope of an individual complaints procedure. The
procedure could be limited to provisions of the Convention that
were specified in the protocol; a State Party could be allowed
to indicate, at the time of ratification of the protocol, that it
accepted the competence of the Committee to hear individual
complaints only with respect to certain articles; the procedure
could be limited to obligations contained in articles 2-16 and
24; or the procedure could apply to the Convention in its entirety, including, for example, the reporting obligation under
article 18.18
The first approach, limiting coverage to those articles
specified in the protocol, raises the question of how one chooses
the articles to be included or excluded. One solution likely to
be suggested is the selection of only those articles which are
commonly accepted as justiciable because of their similarity to
guarantees in other treaties already subject to complaint procedures. This approach, for example, was adopted under the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,' 8 ' which provides that individual complaints can be
made only in respect to two of the rights guaranteed in that
instrument, the right to organize and join trade unions (article
8(a)) and the right to education (article 13).182 A slightly different approach was adopted in relation to the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence against Women (Convention of Bel6m do Par).'83

180. This list of options is based on that discussed in the context of an optional protocol to the Economic Covenant, ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1,
68; see also van Hoof, supra note 74, at 163.
181. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: "Protocol of San Salvador", Nov. 14,
1988, 28 I.L.M. 161 (1989) [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
182. Id. art. 19(6), 28 I.L.M. at 168. However, it should be noted that the
rights designated as subject to the communications procedure did not include all
the rights which the Inter-American Court, in its views on the draft additional
Protocol, considered justiciable. See Observations of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights on the Draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights, 1986 INTER-AM. Y.B. H..

440, 440-49.

183. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Bel~m do Pard), supra note 54.
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Article 12 of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard permits individuals, groups, or non-governmental organizations to lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
alleging violations of article 7 by a State Party to the Convention, one of the three articles contained in Chapter III of the
Convention,' headed "Duties of the States."1' 4
However, we have argued that all obligations contained in
the Convention may be considered justiciable and therefore
appropriate subjects for a complaints procedure. If only a subset of the rights guaranteed by the Convention were to be
included, then major areas of fundamental importance to the
elimination of discrimination such as education, health, and
possibly employment, would be removed from the scope of the
protocol, while other obligations of less significance for many
women would be covered. Excluding all but the obligations
which are clearly justiciable on a narrow view of justiciability
would also deprive the Committee of the opportunity to elaborate further the precise content of some of the more open-ended obligations.'85
Allowing individual States Parties to choose the articles
they wish to accept as subject to the complaints procedure
would also lead to complexity in the administration of the
protocol. It would permit states to embrace the individual
complaint procedure, while in effect avoiding scrutiny of major
areas of obligation.8 6 Indeed, it may allow a state to place an

184. The reason for limiting complaints to alleged violations of article 7 appears to be that under article 7 States Parties "undertake" to do a number of
specific things to eliminate violence against women, while in article 8 the States
Parties "agree to undertake progressively" specific measures including a number of
programs. Id. arts. 7-8, 33 I.L.M. at 1536-37. Under article 9 States Parties "shall
take special account" of the vulnerability of women to violence by reasons of race,
ethnic background or other characteristics. Id. art. 9, 33 IL.M. at 1537. However,

this explanation is not completely satisfying, since a number of obligations under
article 8 appear capable of external monitoring, while a number of those in article
7 are of a type which might traditionally be characterized as non-justiciable (e.g.,
the obligation in article 7(e) to take all appropriate measures to modify existing
law and practices contributing to violence). Id. arts. 7-8, 33 I.L.M. at 1536-37.
185. See ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, 9I 70. See the similar views
expressed in relation to the Economic Covenant by Habitat International Coalition
and Foodfirst Information and Action Network. Joint Written Statement, Comm. on
Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8,
9(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21NG0/45
(1995).
186. Under the European Social Charter (which still has only a reporting obligation) States Parties are permitted to choose to a limited extent the obligations
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exclusion zone around those areas in which its failures to implement its obligations are most pronounced. The interdependence and overlap of many of the obligations in the Convention
also militates against permitting this smorgasbord approach.
For example, if a state were unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of the Committee with respect to article 16, but did
accept jurisdiction over article 2, it is unclear whether an individual could bring a claim challenging discriminatory divorce
laws on the ground of inconsistency with article 2, which covers in general terms what article 16 addresses specifically in
relation to marriage.
Under many existing international and regional instruthe Racial
ments, including the First Optional Protocol,'
8
the Torture Convention,8 9
Discrimination Convention,'
9
0
the European Convention,' and the American Convention
on Human Rights,' the approach is that when a State Party
accepts the competence of a supervisory body to consider individual complaints, acceptance extends to all substantive obligations accepted by the State Party under the relevant treaty.
This approach promotes the integrity of the Convention regime
and should be adopted under any proposed protocol to the
Women's Convention. By bringing a broader range of potential
complaints within the scope of the procedure, more extensive
protection of the rights guaranteed in the Convention can be
achieved. Moreover, although discrimination against women
exists in all countries, different forms of discrimination are of
concern from country to country and may vary over time. Limiting the range of articles which can be addressed under the
procedure may have the effect of excluding from the
Committee's consideration areas in which the most pressing
forms of discrimination against women exist. Inclusion of all
substantive articles within the reach of the optional protocol

to which they wish to be subject. However, this choice is constrained, to ensure
that states accept a minimum core of basic obligations. European Social Charter,
Oct. 18, 1961, art. 20, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, 112-15; DAVID J. HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER 18-21 (1984).

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

16.
9.
49.
54.
54.
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would avoid this dilemma.
It does not appear that individual complaints relating to
the failure of a State Party to fulfill its reporting obligations
would be receivable under article 14 of the Racial Discrimination Convention'92 or the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR,'93 because of the emphasis on rights in the jurisdictional criteria contained in those instruments. No treaty guarantees the right to have one's state submit its report on time
or indeed at all. Accordingly, the reporting obligation might be
viewed merely as a matter of multilateral interstate concern,
with the view being taken that failure to report in a timely
manner does not result in any real detriment to individuals
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.
It is possible, however, to take a more expansive approach.
Alston, for example, has noted the importance of reporting for
raising awareness of treaty obligations at the national level
and has stressed the role that such reports should play in
national discussion and policy-making.'94 This perspective is
shared by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.'95 While a person might not be a victim or directly
affected by a State Party's failure to report, this failure can
nonetheless impact on the enjoyment of rights at the national
level. The failure of many states to report on time, or at all,
under the Women's Convention and other treaties suggests
that there may be some point in including this obligation within the scope of an optional protocol. However, this approach
assumes that the lodging of an individual complaint might
spur a government into action, where notes verbales, informal
contacts, and public identification of delinquent states have
not. Whether this assumption is correct or whether there are
more appropriate ways to encourage states to fulfill these obligations"' remains to be seen.

192. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at
230-33.
193. See supra note 16.
194. Philip Alston, The Purposes of Reporting, in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH,
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 13, 14-16 (1991).
195. See infra note 88.
196. The reason given by Alston for excluding the reporting obligation from his
proposed draft of an optional protocol to the Economic Covenant, see ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, 9191
13, 16.
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B. Inquiry by the Committee on its Own Motion
The inquiry procedure proposed in the Maastricht draft
would empower the Committee to initiate an inquiry only in
cases in which it appears that there are serious or systematic
failures by a State Party to fulfill its obligations under the
Convention. The threshold requirement for initiation 9 7 of an
inquiry would ensure that only flagrant violations of the Convention would trigger the procedure. Accordingly, it would not
be
seem appropriate to limit the particular articles that can
98
considered by the Committee in making that assessment.

VI. THE MAASTRICHT DRAFT
We have already described the broad outline of the
Maastricht draft, which, as may be recalled, proposes the adoption of an optional protocol that would confer on CEDAW the
power to receive individual complaints and inquire on its own
motion into the situation in a State Party when the Committee
receives reliable information indicating the existence of serious
or systematic violations of the Convention by a State Party. In
parts A, B, and C of this section, we provide a detailed description of the Maastricht draft. In part D of this section, we examine a number of residual concerns that may be raised in discussion about the adoption of any protocol. These concerns
relate less to the merits of the proposal than to institutional
aspects of the operation of the U.N. human rights system.
They include the question of whether any complaint mechanism for the Convention would merely serve to duplicate existing procedures and mechanisms and also relate to resource
and institutional implications which would flow from the addi-

197. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
198. Although the Maastricht draft does not propose an interstate procedure, it
may be noted that such procedures under other instruments do not directly limit
the scope of obligations which can be made the subject of a complaint, and there
seems to be no particular reason why this example should not be followed in the
present case. Concerns about justiciability have been dealt with above, and would
be equally applicable under an interstate procedure. Even if complaints about nonsubmission of reports are not brought within the individual complaints procedure,
a State Party would be able to complain about the failure of another State Party
to submit a report, since the communication will involve an allegation that another State Party is not fulfilling its "obligations" under the Convention. This, presumably, would include the reporting obligation under article 18. See Women's
Convention, supra note 3, art. 18, 1259 U.N.T.S. at 22.
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tion of any protocol. We conclude by expressing the view that
although there may be legal and institutional concerns that
might be raised in discussion of any proposed protocol, these
can be resolved and should not stand in the way of elaboration
and adoption of a protocol modelled very much along the lines
of the Maastricht draft. Deviation from the Maastricht model
may be appropriate to strengthen its terms, but there appears
little reason either to reject it in its entirety or weaken it in
any way.
A. Individual Communications Procedure (PartI of the Draft
Optional Protocol)
Part I of the Maastricht draft, comprising articles 1-10,'
contains an individual complaints procedure, modelled on existing individual complaints procedures under the Racial Discrimination Convention, the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, and the Torture Convention. The general structure
and much of the language of existing procedures under these
other treaties have been employed, the intention being that the
jurisprudence and practice under comparable procedures will
be applicable to the optional protocol. However, by drawing on
the experience under those procedures, it seeks to avoid their
limitations and deficiencies. 0 0
1. Who May Complain?

20 1

All existing complaints procedures permit individuals to
lodge complaints. Variations exist with respect to whether
others, such as groups or organizations, can also lodge complaints and as to the standing individuals or others must have
in order to be entitled to lodge such complaints. For example,
article 25 of the European Convention entitles the European

199. See infra appendix (for articles 1-10 of the Maastricht draft).
200. See, e.g., Opsahl, supra note 16, at 426 (noting that "[tihe haste in which
the Optional Protocol [to the ICCPR was drafted may explain its ambiguity and
brevity on essential points"). See generally P. R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights
Committee and the Right of Individual Communication, 1986 BRITISH YJB. INT'L L.
201.
201. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 41-121; A. Cangado Trindade, Coexistence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human
Rights (At Global and Regional Levels), in 202 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243-299 (1987).
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Commission to receive applications "from any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation.... .2o2 Similarly, article 44 of
the American Convention on Human Rights allows petitions to
be lodged by "[alny person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member
States of the Organization .. .""03 The procedure established
by the UNESCO Executive Board permits communications to
be submitted by "a person or group of persons who, it can be
reasonably presumed, are victims of an alleged violation of
[specified] human rights" or by "any person, group of persons
or organization having reliable knowledge of those violations .... ,204 Article 14(1) of the Racial Discrimination Convention allows communications from individuals or groups of
individuals." 5 On the other hand, the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR provides that only natural persons ("individuals")
may submit communications under the Protocol." 6 As a result, the Human Rights Committee has held that corporations
cannot lodge complaints under the First Optional Protocol0 7
and that groups as such have no standing, although their
members may lodge a composite claim relying on their individual entitlements.2 "'
Article 2 of the draft protocol provides that a communication may be submitted by an individual, group, or organization.0 9 It provides that:
202. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 25, 213
U.N.T.S. at 236.
203. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 44, 1144
U.N.T.S. at 155; see also Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child,
supra note 54, art. 44 (permits communications from "any person, group or nongovernmental organization" recognized by the OAU, by a member state or by the
United Nations).
14(a)(ii). See generally for the
204. UNESCO Decision, supra note 66,
UNESCO procedure, David Weissbrodt & Rose Farley, The UNESCO Human
Rights Procedure:An Evaluation, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 391 (1994).
205. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 14(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at
230-31.
206. First Optional Protocol, supra note 16, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 302.
207. A Newspaper Publishing Co. v. Trinidad & Tobago, Communication No.
36011989, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex XIJ,, at 307, U.N. Doc. A/44140 (1989).
208. Hartikainen v. Finland;Communication No. 4011978, in UNITED NATIONS,
1 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUmAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL 74 (1985).

209. The Convention itself does not specify its territorial or jurisdictional cover-
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1. An individual, group or organization:
(a) claiming to have suffered detriment as a result of a
violation of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention,
or claiming to be directly affected by the failure on the part
of a State Party to the Protocol to give effect to its obligations
under the Convention; or
(b) claiming that a State Party has violated any of the
rights set forth in the Convention or has failed to give effect
to any of its obligations under the Convention with respect to
a person or group of persons other than the author, and having in the opinion of the Committee a sufficient interest in
the matter.21 °

age, unlike other treaties which extend protection to everyone "subject to the jurisdiction" or "within the territory" of a state, but it can be assumed that the
Convention's obligations do extend to everyone within the jurisdiction of individual
States Parties. As Rimmer points out, the original draft provided that complaints
against a State Party could be received "from or on the behalf of individuals,
groups of individuals, juridical persons or organizations subject to its jurisdiction,"
but this phrase is not repeated in the final version of the draft Protocol. Rimmer,
supra note 38, § 25. Retention of the phrase would have meant that the jurisprudence relating to this phrase under the ICCPR would have been applicable to this
provision, so that complaints could deal with not only acts within the physical
territory of the State Party, but would also include other exercises of its sovereign
jurisdiction. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 95-99, 109-20.
Rimmer notes that the omission of the phrase might permit persons or
organizations outside the State Party concerned, and not subject to its jurisdiction
in any way, to lodge complaints. Rimmer, supra note 38, § 25. This was in fact
the reason for the omission of the phrase, as it was felt that in some cases, it
might not be possible or safe for women in a State Party or subject to the state's
jurisdiction to lodge a complaint. Rimmer argues that the present formulation is
too broad to survive the negotiation of a text by states, and that, if it were adopted, it would act as a disincentive to ratification. Id.
210. See infra appendix (for article 2 of the Maastricht draft). The draft provides that a complaint may be submitted by any person, group or organization
who "claim[s] to have suffered detriment as a result of a violation of any of the
rights guaranteed in the Convention, or [who] claim[s] to be directly affected by a
failure of a State Party ... to give effect to its obligations under the Convention . . . " Id. This contrasts with the language used in a number of the other
treaties. For example, article 1 of the First Optional Protocol speaks of persons
who claim to be "victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set
forth in the Covenant." First Optional Protocol, supra note 16, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 302. Article 14 of the Racial Discrimination Convention and article 25 of the
European Convention are expressed in similar terms. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at 230; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. Article 22(1) of the Convention against Torture refers to "victims of a violation of the provisions of this
Convention." Torture Convention, supra note 49, art. 22(i). The difference in wording (between "victims of a violation of rights guaranteed" and "victims of a violation of the provisions of this Convention") is presumably attributable to the fact
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This provision is intended to be at least as broad as existing
standing requirements; a person who could satisfy the test of
being a "victim of a violation" under existing case law2 .
would satisfy the standing requirements laid down in the draft
article 2. However, the provision goes beyond existing standing
requirements, a move motivated by a desire to ensure that
systemic discrimination against women is adequately addressed, especially in view of the fact that women may face
particular disadvantages in securing information about and
access to remedies.
A broad range of individuals and groups, including organizations, are thus permitted to lodge complaints.212 A number
of reasons can be adduced in support of this approach. First, as
with other treaties, the submission of a complaint by an individual may involve considerable danger to that individual. Second, where an individual communication raises more general
issues and the particular circumstances of the person's case
are not likely to be decisive to the resolution of these issues,
there seems to be little point in preventing groups or organizations from submitting complaints. For example, if the complaint is that a State Party has failed to grant women the
same rights as men to transmit their nationality to their children, then the claim could be raised equally well by an organization of women affected by this inequality without naming all
the individuals. Similarly, in some countries for a married
woman to bring an individual complaint concerning the failure
of national law to criminalize marital rape may result in conthat most of the provisions of the ICCPR are statements of rights, whereas the
provisions of the Torture Convention are phrased in the terms "States parties
shall." However, there appears to be little practical difference between the two
formulations, since the Racial Discrimination Convention uses the language more
appropriate to rights, while most of its substantive provisions are formulated as a
series of explicit undertakings by states ("States shall take . . . ").
For a discussion of the use of "hard" language ("violations") and "soft" language ("failure to give effect to obligations"), see Discussion on the Draft Optional
Protocols, in RIGHT TO COMPLAIN, supra note 39, at 209, 213-14 [hereinafter Discussion]. The Alston and Utrecht drafts adopt a compromise by using the "softer"
language in the context of the Committee's findings.
211. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 50-71; Tom Zwart, Standing to
Sue in Human Rights Litigation:Abstract and Hypothetical Cases, in 3 THE DYNAMIICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 83, at 361.
212. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a broadened
standing requirement in the context of the Utrecht Draft Protocol (which retains
the traditional "victim" requirement), see Discussion, supra note 210, at 211-12.
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siderable personal danger, whereas an organization with a
sufficient interest in the matter may be less subject to such
threats.
Although article 2(a) goes beyond existing standing requirements, it may still not be sufficiently wide." 3 For example, the provision might not permit a family planning organization working with women to submit a complaint in its own
name in relation to laws or government practices which restrict women's access to adequate contraceptives. Arguably,

213. Nowak notes that in some cases the Human Rights Committee has been
prepared to take a broad view of the interest necessary for a person to qualify as
a victim, but this would probably not cover the cases referred to in the text.
NOWAK, supra note 73, at 659-61.
Rimmer argues that the existing article 2 is unsatisfactory, since it encompasses three tests for standing, each formulated slightly differently and, in his
view, likely to give rise to "significant confusion in determining the test to apply
in any given circumstance." Rimmer, supra note 38, § 26. He proposes that the
tests be simplified and that the phrase "directly affected" be used throughout. His
suggested version of the article is:
(2)(1) An individual, group or organization:
(a)claiming to be directly affected by a violation of the rights guaranteed
in the Convention, or directly affected by the failure on the part of a
State Party to this protocol to give effect to its obligations under the
Convention; or
(b)claiming that a person or group of persons has been directly affected
by a violation of the rights guaranteed in the Convention, or directly by
the failure on the part of a State Party to this Protocol to give effect to
its obligations under the Convention, and having in the opinion of the
Committee a sufficient interest,
may submit a written communication to the Committee for examination
Id. §§ 26-27.
However, Rimmer notes that this change "comes at a cost," namely that a
person who suffers detriment (e.g, a child who suffers as a result of discrimination
against the child's mother) may not satisfy the directly affected test. Id. § 27.
Nevertheless, he considers that this would be an acceptable price to pay in order
to "remove the requirement to prove harm" that would exist if a person had to
show that they had suffered detriment as the result of a violation of the rights in
the Convention. Id. If his interpretation is correct, then it hardly seems acceptable
to exclude from the protection of the Protocol categories of "indirect" victims who
would be able to bring a claim under, for example, the First Optional Protocol. If
this category of person is not covered by article 2(1)(b) of the draft (as it would
appear not to be covered by Rimmer's proposed redraft of article 2(1)(b)), then
either the original should be restored or, perhaps, the word "directly" deleted.
However, we are not convinced that providing a number of bases of standing is
necessarily undesirable or that it would pose problems for the Committee to administer.
Whatever the merits of Rimmer's proposed redraft of article 2(1)(b), it may
be useful to state explicitly that the author may -be someone other than a person
directly affected by a violation or failure by the State Party.
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however, such a case would fall within the scope of an organization which is "directly affected" by an alleged failure to give
effect to obligations under the Convention. But it is less clear
whether a local bar association or association of women lawyers would have standing to bring a complaint concerning the
failure to criminalize marital rape, or whether a group monitoring the media would be able to submit a complaint alleging
that a State Party has failed to take appropriate measures to
address the stereotyped and degrading portrayal of women in
the media. Systematic discrimination of this type might be
raised in the context of the inquiry procedure in Part II of the
draft optional protocol, but that would depend on their being
classified as serious or systematic violations of the Convention.
The proposed article 2(b) is intended to allow individual
communications of this nature while, at the same time, precluding officious bystanders from lodging complaints. The proposal would permit individuals and groups who, although
themselves not victims of a violation, have what the Committee deems to be a "sufficient interest" in thi matter. In the
first instance this formulation would allow communications to
be submitted by another person or group on behalf of an individual claiming to be a victim of a violation.2 1 ' However, the
provision would also allow individuals or groups who are not
"directly affected" by violations to lodge communications as
long as the Committee considers that they have "a sufficient
interest" in the matter. This element is innovative and was
intended to take account of the often systematic nature of
gender discrimination and the particular obstacles women may
face, including dangers of reprisal, low levels of literacy, generally and legal literacy in particular, and resource constraints in
seeking remedies for discrimination. It also reflects an awareness that, with regard to structural violations, it may not be
possible to identify particular victims over and above other
women. Many forms of discrimination against women-such as
a state's failure to address the exploitation of prostitution of
women, failure to provide adequate maternity leave and benefits, failure to implement measures to discourage sexual ha-

214. It incorporates the practice of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture insofar as individuals are permitted to bring complaints "on
behalf of' other persons.
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rassment in the workplace, failure to address the stereotypical
portrayal of women in school textbooks, and the failure to
ensure adequate health care and nutrition for pregnant women-affect many women. To require the identification of individual victims or those directly affected by a particular law,
practice, or policy would not be conducive to the aim of eliminating systematic discrimination.215
It is common in discussions of standing under international complaint procedures to state that the procedure should not
permit an actio popularis, but that a complaint should be
lodged only by a person with a direct interest in the outcome.
While there may be good reasons for being concerned about
"purely hypothetical" cases, it is also important to recognize
that requiring in effect that a person be a victim of a violation
may unduly restrict the range of complaints that can be considered. In the present case, while the proposal goes beyond
existing models for important reasons, the requirement of
"sufficient interest" should act as a safeguard against hypothetical or speculative complaints, since it would allow for
careful examination to ensure that the complainants did in fact
have a sufficiently close interest in the matter.
2. Procedural Matters
The procedure contained in Part I of the draft protocol
follows closely the procedure in the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR and the Torture Convention. There are, however, a

215. Alston considers that such an expanded requirement would, at least in the

context of the Economic Covenant, give rise to 'speculative complaints" and omits
it from his proposed draft ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, at q 15. However, it is not clear exactly what types of complaints would be considered speculative
and why it would not be possible to deal with them under the various heads of
inadmissibility proposed. Van Hoof comments in relation to article I of the
Utrecht Draft Protocol, supra note 39, that:

The Optional Protocol's "admission-policy" should not be too strict nor,
however, excessively loose. Concerns about (a flood of) speculative, frivolous or even querulous communications are justified in that they would
unjustly damage the State Party concerned and in the final analysis are
bound to backfire at the work under the Optional Protocol itself. Prevention of such unintended consequences should not, however, be attempted
by limiting the right of communication, but should rather be left to the

Protocol Committee through the application of the admissibility conditions.
van Hoof, supra note 74, at 161.
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number of significant differences. The first formal stage of the
procedure is the determination of the admissibility of the communication. The Committee is obliged to decline the complaint
if it does not meet all the specified admissibility criteria. The
second stage is the consideration of the merits of the communication, involving consideration by the Committee (and the
other party) of submissions made to the Committee by one
party. The third stage is the adoption by the Committee of its
decision or views as to whether there has been a failure by the
State Party to give effect to its obligations under the Convention, as well as of any recommendations the Committee wishes
to address to the State Party. The fourth stage involves follow
up, whereby the State Party would report the steps it has
taken to give effect to the views expressed by the Committee,
and the Committee would keep the case under review until it
was satisfied that any failure to implement obligations had
been remedied. The procedure is confidential until the Committee decides to publish its views." 6
Three major differences exist between the procedure proposed in the draft optional protocol and the procedure under
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR:
1) the Committee is not limited in its consideration of the
communication only to written material, 1 ' or to material
made available to it by the author or the State Party;
2) the State Party undertakes an explicit obligation to give
effect to the views and recommendations of the Committee;
and
3) the Committee is not functus officio with the adoption of
its views, but has express powers to keep the communication
under review until, in the Committee's opinion, it has been
satisfactorily resolved.

216. The Utrecht draft of an optional protocol to the Economic Covenant does
not impose a requirement of confidentiality in the proceedings. Utrecht Draft Protocol, art. VIII, supra note 39, at 236.
217. There is some dispute as to whether the Human Rights Committee is
indeed so limited. See, e.g., GRAEFRATH, supra note 61, at 161-62 and NOwAK,
supra note 73, at 691-92 (who both maintain that it is). But see Opsahl, supra
note 16, at 427 (who maintain that it is not).
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3. Admissibility Matters
a. Anonymity21 8
The draft excludes anonymous complaints, as do other
international and regional procedures. However, this prohibition does not necessarily mean the identity of a complainant
must be disclosed to the State Party, although it must be made
known to the Committee. Of course, in many cases it will be
necessary to disclose the identity of the author in order for the
state concerned to investigate the facts of the case. Specific
provision for the protection of authors of communications could
be addressed in the optional protocol itself or, perhaps more
appropriately, in the rules of procedure. 19
22 °
b. Substantive Coverage (Admissibility Ratione Materiae)

The Maastricht draft provides in article 3(2)(a) that a
complaint will be inadmissible ratione materiae if it does not
contain allegations which, if substantiated, would constitute a
violation of rights guaranteed by the Convention or a failure by
a State Party to give effect to its obligations under article
3(2)(a) of the Convention.22 ' In other words, a complaint must
state a claim which falls within the scope of the Convention
and the obligations assumed by the State Party. This requirement is a standard requirement in other individual complaint
procedures. However, sometimes the question of whether the
author has "sufficiently substantiated" a claim is dealt with as
a question of admissibility, and claims which do not reach this
threshold are sometimes dismissed on the ground that they are
"manifestly ill-founded" or "incompatible with the provisions
of' the instrument in question. The inquiry involves an assess-

218. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 155-56. In relation to the Utrecht
Draft Protocol, supra note 39, which closely follows the Maastricht draft, see van
Hoof, supra note 74, at 164-70.
219. The Racial Discrimination Convention provides an example of the type of
provision which might be adopted. Article 14(6)(a) of that convention provides that

"the identity of the individual or groups of individuals concerned shall not be
revealed without his or their express consent." Racial Discrimination Convention,
supra note 9, art. 14(6)(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 232-33. The Maastricht draft does not
contain a provision to this effect, as it was considered more appropriate to include
such a provision in the rules of procedure.
220. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 139-54.
221. See infra appendix (for article 3(2)(a) of the Maastricht draft).
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ment of whether the allegations and supporting evidence provided by the author are sufficient to permit the case to continue-a sort of prima facie case requirement.
Dealing with this question as an issue of threshold admissibility, and obscuring the basis of the dismissal in the categories of "manifestly ill-founded" and "incompatible" communicaUnder
tions have been criticized by some commentators.'
article 4(1) of the Maastricht draft, the approach adopted is to
provide explicitly that the Committee may decline to continue
examining a communication if the person submitting the communication fails to provide information which would sufficiently substantiate the allegations, after having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so.'
4. Temporal Applicability (Admissibility Ratione Temporis)
Once the optional protocol enters into force, it will be necessary to determine whether acts or omissions which occurred
before its entry into force, or situations which arose before that
time, can be the subject of communications under the protocol.
Two issues need to be considered. First, whether the critical
date for a State Party is the entry into force of the Convention
itself or the date of entry into force of the optional protocol;
and second, how one deals with so-called continuing violations.
As a matter of general principle, one might presume that
the critical date is the date of entry into force of the protocol
and that only acts or omissions occurring after that date would
be cognizable under the protocol. However, experience under
the First Optional Protocol suggests that it may be desirable to
state this clearly in the text of the protocol itself. The Human
Rights Committee has taken the view that the critical date is
the date of entry into force of the First Optional Protocol and
that violations occurring between the entry into force of the
Covenant for that state and the entry into force of the First
Optional Protocol are inadmissible ratione temporis under the
Optional Protocol. However, Manfred Nowak argues that the
better interpretation is that ratification of the Optional Protocol merely involves recognition of one avenue for redressing
violations of the Covenant and that alleged violations after the
222. A notable example is NOWAK, supra note 73, at 666-68.
223. See infra appendix (for article 4(1) of the Maastricht draft).
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entry into force of the Covenant can be consideredY 4 While
the Human Rights Committee has not accepted this view explicitly,' it seems preferable to make the critical date clear
in the optional protocol to the Women's Convention. Accordingly, article 3(2)(b) of the draft optional protocol provides that a
communication relating to acts or omissions which occurred
before the entry into force of the optional protocol for the State
Party concerned would not be admissibleY 6
This still leaves the question of acts or omissions which
occur prior to the entry into force of the optional protocol, but
which constitute so-called "continuing violations." The Human
Rights Committee has accepted that, even where an act constituting a violation first occurs before the date of entry into force
of the complaints procedure, those acts can be considered
where the acts "continueU after the entry into force of the
Optional Protocol and allegedly constitute[] a continu[ing]
violation of the Covenant or [have] effects that themselves
constitute a violation of the Covenant." 7 The Committee has
recently observed that:
A continuing violation is to be interpreted as an affirmation,
after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, by act or
clear implication, of previous violations of the State Party. 228

This approach has meant, for example, that detention without
trial initiated before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, but which continues after that date, could be considered
under the procedure. However, a failure to pay compensation

224. NOWAK, supra note 73, at 678-81; Manfred Nowak, The Activities of the
UN-Human Rights Committee: Developments from 1 August 1989 through 21 July
1982, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 9 (1993).
225. See Parkdnyi v. Hungary, Communication No 41011990, Report of the

Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 317, U.N.
Doe. A147/40 (1994), in which the Committee did consider a violation that occurred
before entry into force of the Optional Protocol, on the basis that the State Party
had not objected to this.
226. See infra appendix (for article 3(2)(b) of the Maastricht draft).
227. M.T. v. Spain, Communication No. 31011988, Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 284, 285, U.N. Doc. A/46/40
(1991).
228. E. & A.K v. Hungary, Communication No. 520/1992, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 336, 339, U.N.
Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
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for the expropriation of property before the entry into force of
the Optional Protocol could not be considered. Consequently,
determining whether an alleged violation is a continuing one is
a difficult task and ultimately one for the Human Rights Committee to determine in the circumstances of a particular case.
Article 3(2)(b) of the draft optional protocol is intended to
set out the position as it exists under the First Optional Protocol. It provides that a communication will be inadmissible
where it relates to acts and omissions which occurred before
the entry into force for the State Party concerned, unless those
acts or omissions:
(i) constitute a continuing violation of the Convention or a
continuing failure to give effect to the state's obligations
under the Convention; or
(ii) have effects which continue beyond the entry into force
of this Protocol and those effects themselves constitute a
violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention or a failure
by the State Party concerned to give effect to its obligations
under the Convention.229

5. Abuse of the Right of Petitione

°

Draft article 3(2)(c) provides that the Committee shall
decline to consider a communication if it involves an abuse of
the right to submit a communication." This provision is intended to cover cases in which a complainant may already
have submitted the same complaint and there are no new
developments, or where a complaint may be vexatious. Arguably, such powers would already be within the implied power
of the Committee. This particular ground of inadmissibility
along with the criterion of incompatibility with the provisions
of the relevant instrument, has been criticized by Maxime
Tardu as vague, lending itself to arbitrary interpretation, and
more relevant to "the era of grace and favour" or of the "king's
pleasure," 2 but, nonetheless, was regarded as appropriate
for inclusion by the Maastricht meeting.

229.
230.
231.
232.

See infra appendix (for article 3(2)(b)(i)-(ii) of the Maastricht draft).
See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 156-68.
See infra appendix (for article 3(2)(c) of the Maastricht draft).
Tardu, supra note 152,
126.
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6. The Requirement of Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies1 3
The threshold admissibility criteria adopted by international and regional human rights bodies for individual complaints generally include the requirement that the complainant
exhaust domestic remedies before submitting the communication to the international body. The purpose of this requirement
is to ensure that the state is given the opportunity to rectify,
through its own national, legal, and administrative system,
any violation of rights guaranteed by the international instrument. However, various exceptions exist to the strict application of a rule that all local remedies must first be exhausted. 4 Rather than seeking to list all the possible variants,"5 the Maastricht draft opts for a general reference to
the rule. Article 3(3)(a) of the draft simply provides that a
communication shall not be admissible unless the Committee
has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been
exhausted, unless the Committee considers that the application of this requirement would be unreasonable. 6 As women
in many countries are very often unaware of their legal rights,
a generous interpretation of draft article 3(3)(a) will be required.' For example, cases where the complainant was un233. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 187-230.
234. See NOWAK, supra note 73, at 703-07; ZWART, supra note 155, at 214-19.
235. This was the approach adopted in the discussion draft which provided that
the exhaustion requirement would not apply:
where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged, is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person, group or organisation who
has been detrimentally affected by the violation of this Convention, where
the domestic legislation of the State concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have been violated, or the person or group who has been detrimentally affected by the
violation of this Convention has been denied access to the remedies of
domestic jurisdiction or has been prevented from exhausting them.
236. See infra appendix (for article 3(3)(a) of the Maastricht draft). The issue of
whether the qualification that the requirement of exhaustion would not be applied
if it were unreasonable to do so was the subject of differing views in the drafting
of the Utrecht Draft Protocol. See Utrecht Draft Protocol, supra note 39. One commentator was concerned that such a relaxation of the rule might deter states from
ratifying the Protocol, van Hoof, supra note 74, at 168-69, while another was not
so convinced. Bert Vierdag, Comments on the Utrecht and Committee Draft Optional Protocols, in THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN, supra note 39, at 199, 202-03. Although
not included in the preliminary Utrecht draft, the phrase appears in article 3(a) of
the Final Version. Utrecht Draft Protocol, supra note 39, at 234.
237. Though it may not be able to be relied on in view of the approach taken
by the European Commission in a number of cases in which ignorance of the local
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aware of local remedies or the possibility of their use, and is
prevented from seeking relief under national law by the time
she discovers these remedies, should fall within the exception,
unless the State Party concerned can show the Committee that
it was unreasonable for a person in the complainant's position
to have been unaware of these avenues.
The draft is intended to incorporate the jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee on the question of the burden of
proof in relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies."
Normally, the complainant is required to show that available
remedies have been exhausted, would not have been effective,
or that there are special circumstances which absolve her from
exhausting domestic remedies in the particular case. 9 The
State Party is required to give details of the remedies it claims
are available and to show that these remedies would be effective. General assertions by the State Party that the complainant has not exhausted domestic remedies, without the provision of further details, would not satisfy the state's burden
and, if the state offered no additional information, the Committee would hold that there had been no failure to exhaust
available domestic remedies.
7. Desirability of a Time Limit for the Lodging of
Communications
Unlike the European Convention and the American Convention on Human Rights, the Maastricht draft does not incorporate any time limit within which complaints must be submitted following the exhaustion of loc;l remedies. The existence of
a time limit has been justified by the European Commission on
a number of grounds, including the need to ensure legal, administrative, and personal certainty, and the need to ensure
that cases raising issues under the European Convention are
examined within a reasonable period so as to facilitate timely
establishment of the facts. The secretariat to the Human
Rights Committee at one time proposed the imposition of a 24

remedies available was held not to justify making an exception to the normal rule.
ZWART, supra note 155, at 229; 5 DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CASE-LAW RELATING TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 273-76 (1985).
238. NOWAK, supra note 73, at 706-07.
239. Id. at 703-07.
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month time limit for the ICCPR, but this proposal was rejected. 240 The Human Rights Committee has not felt the need to
revisit the issue since that time. The imposition of a time limit
in any protocol to the Women's Convention would limit access
to the Committee, a result which, in the absence of some convincing reason, seems undesirable.2 4 ' The fact that women
suffer from particular disadvantages, such as low levels of
legal literacy and a lack of awareness of the international
procedures for the enforcement of their rights, may constitute
a further reason for not imposing a time limit at this stage.
If a time limit were considered appropriate, then one alternative would be to provide that, while complaints should be
lodged within 24 months of the exhaustion of local remedies,
the Committee may, where it considers it reasonable in the
circumstances of the case, extend the period. However, stipulating a time limit in cases where either domestic remedies are
not available or have been unduly prolonged, or where the
violation is a continuing one, may give rise to difficulties. Another option is found in those procedures which provide that
communications must be submitted within a reasonable
time.2 42 For example, communications submitted under the
Resolution 1503 procedure must be submitted "within a reasonable time after the exhaustion of... domestic remedies."
Similarly, for a communication to be admissible under the UNESCO communications procedure, it must be submitted "within a reasonable time-limit following the facts
which constitute its subject-matter or within a reasonable
time-limit after the facts have become known."24 4
8. Relationship to Other Complaint Mechanisms24 5
Existing international complaint procedures seek to avoid
a situation where the same complaint is considered by two

240. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 49, at 129.
241. ZWART, supra note 155, at 169-70.
242. This was the approach proposed in the Utrecht draft, van Hoof, supra
note 74, at 169-70, but was not finally adopted.
243. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res. 1(XXIV),
5, U.N. Doc. EtCN.411070, E/CN.4/Sub.21323 (1971).
244. UNESCO Decision, supra note 66, 5 14(a)(viii).
245. See generally Trindade, supra note 201, at 127-209; ZWART, supra note
155, at 173-85.
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different international bodies. Two basic approaches have been
adopted.2 46 The first approach provides that, where a complaint is being considered by another international complaint
procedure, substantially the same complaint will not be admissible before another body until the matter is no longer pending
before the first body. Such an approach views the pending
proceedings as having a suspensive effect on the admissibility
of the communication. If the complaint procedure before the
first body is terminated for whatever reason, it no longer acts
as a bar to the admissibility of the communication before the
second body. This is the approach adopted in the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.247
The second approach excludes from consideration not just
a communication which is presently being considered by another body, but it also excludes from consideration a communication raising substantially the same matter which has already
been considered by another body. However, if the earlier consideration is to bar its subsequent consideration, the procedure
must be similar in nature to the later procedure, the issues
must be substantially similar, the parties must be the same,
and any earlier decision must have been on the merits. This is
the approach adopted, for example, in article 27(1)(b) of the
European Convention24 8 and article 21(5)(a) of the Torture
Convention."'
Article 3(3)(b) of the Maastricht draft embodies the second
approach, so that the Committee will not be competent to consider a complaint where that complaint raises substantially the
same issues of law and fact as an earlier communication.2 0
This may, however, lead to some difficulties. Assume, for example, that a complaint is made that a State Party to both the
First Optional Protocol and the optional protocol to the
Women's Convention has, by failing to legislate against sexual
harassment against women in the workplace, not given effect
to its obligations under articles 2(1) and 7 of the ICCPR. If this
complaint were to be routed to the Human Rights Committee

246. See NOWAK, supra note 73, at 695-702.
247. See Id. at 695-96.
248. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 27(1)(b), 213
U.N.T.S. at 238-39.
249. Torture Convention, supra note 49, art. 21(5)(a), at 199.
250. See infra appendix (for article 3(3)(b) of the Maastricht draft).
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and it held that the obligation of the State Party under articles
2(1) and 7 of the ICCPR did not mandate the enactment of
legislation against sexual harassment in employment, could
the matter then come before CEDAW under articles 2 and 11
of the Women's Convention, if the proposed formulation were
adopted? It may be argued that the matter is substantially the
same and has been considered on the merits, even though the
two Committees might take different views of whether there is
a violation of the arguably similar obligations under their
respective treaties. Further consideration may need to be given
to adopting the first approach of the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR. Where a complaint was on all fours with an earlier
complaint already considered by another body, CEDAW would
still be entitled to reject it.
9. Need for an Urgent Action Procedure"'
Article 5 of the draft protocol provides explicit power for
the Committee to request the state to take interim measures
pending the adoption of its final views on a complaint. 2 The
provision is also intended to permit the Committee (or one or
more of its members) to take action as a matter of urgency
where immediate action is required to prevent irreparable
harm to the complainantY3 The Human Rights Committee
has provided for this essential power in its rules of procedure.
Such a power is even more important for CEDAW in view of
the fact it meets less regularly than the Human Rights Committee. Article 5(2) obliges States Parties to take all necessary
steps to comply with such a request.
10. The Possibility of Settlement
Article 6(3) of the draft Optional Protocol, 4 like the European and American Conventions on Human Rights,2 5 pro251. See generally ZWART, supra note 155, at 14-16, 34-37; Theo Van Boven,
Facing Urgent Human Rights Cases: Legal and Diplomatic Action, in 3 THE DYNA1TICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 83, at 61.
252. See infra appendix (for article 5 of the Maastricht draft).
253. On the importance of ensuring that appropriate action can be taken between sessions in the context of the Human Rights Committee, see Tardu, supra
note 152,
133-141.
254. See infra appendix (for article 6(3) of the Maastricht draft).
255. See generally Alexandre Kiss, Conciliation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR
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vides for the possibility of a settlement between the complainant and the State Party on the basis of the rights and obligations set forth in the Convention. During its discussion of the
proposed protocol, CEDAW, sympathetic to concerns about the
appropriateness of creating a complaints procedure which
would be both quasi-judicial and adversarial, emphasized its
confidential nature, and its constructive, conciliatory, and
mediatory aspectsY
During the elaboration of the proposed protocol, it is likely
that arguments about its inevitably adversarial nature will be
made. Proponents of these views are likely to maintain that
the creation of an adversarial approach will adversely affect
the constructive dialogue and atmosphere of cooperation necessary for the implementation of the Convention and will, accordingly, hamper or obstruct the realization of its goals.
Such concerns have not, however, been considered sufficiently weighty to prevent the adoption of complaint procedures under other international human rights treaties. If they
are given undue weight in the development of an optional
protocol to the Women's Convention, they will, again, reflect an
attitude that discrimination against women is a second-rate
concern of the international community. Although complaint
procedures are in no way a panacea, they have had considerable impact. Conversely, the impact of the cooperative approach through reporting, while valuable, has been of limited
effect. The Maastricht draft seeks to strike a compromise,
retaining both the adversarial elements of a complaint process
and the conciliatory aspects of settlement.
11. Fact-Finding Procedures and Evidentiary Matters
Article 7 confers on the Committee broad powers to collect
information and to conduct its fact finding and other functions
as it sees fit. 7 In this respect, the Maastricht draft diverges

THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 703.
256. See Roberta Jacobson, The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, in A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 2, at 444, 449; Oeser, supra
note 20, at 53; supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (regarding the concerns
raised at drafting of the 674th Meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women); see also ESCRC Analytical Paper, supra note 1, J 43 (raising similar concerns
about the drafting of an optional protocol to the Economic Covenant).
257. See infra appendix (for article 7 of the Maastricht draft).

766

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. =X:3

from the First Optional Protocol, which confines the Human
Rights Committee to consideration only of written materials
provided to it by the author and the State Party concerned."5
Article 7 does not limit the sources of information on which the
Committee may draw. Consequently, it may look to reports
from specialized agencies, reports of special rapporteurs of the
Commission on Human Rights, to NGO material, and other
relevant documents. Under article 7(1), however, the Committee is required to provide copies of this material to both the
author and the State Party in order that they may respond to
it. Moreover, the draft article gives the Committee a general
power to regulate its own procedures: this could include oral
hearings, on-site visits (with the consent of the State Party
concerned), 9 or the appointment of an independent expert to
assist it-in its fact-finding tasks. Thus, Article 7 is intended to
ensure a wide range of powers to the Committee so that it can
perform its functions in the most effective manner possible.
12. The Status of a Decision by the Committee
With regard to decisions rendered by treaty bodies under
existing individual complaint procedures, the generally accepted view is that these decisions are not, as a formal matter,
legally binding on the State Party concerned, nor are they a
legally binding interpretation of the treaty vis-A-vis other
States Parties. 2" The consequence of this is that a State Par-

258. Commentators have argued that the limitation in the ICCPR Optional
Protocol to a written procedure is unsatisfactory. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 49;
Christian Tomuschat, Evolving Procedural Rules: The U.N.-Human Rights
Committee's First Two Years of Dealing with Individual Communications, 1 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 249, 254 (1980). On fact-finding procedures under the European Convention, see Kersten Rogge, Fact-finding, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 677.

259. The Inter-American Commission, the European Commission of Human
Rights and the ILO have capacity for on-site visits. The experience of these bodies
suggests such investigations are of assistance to human rights organs in their
determinations. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1982). The exercise of such a power in the case

of CEDAW would have significant resource implications. Robert E. Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, 15 TE. INVL L.J. 46 (1980).
260. See, e.g., GRAEFATH, supra note 61, at 167-68; NOWAK, supra note 73, at
710. However, Messrs. Pocar and Mulllerson have argued that a combination of
article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol and article 2(3) of the ICCPR have the effect
of obliging States to abide by the views of the Human Rights Committee. See
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ty is not bound, as a matter of international law, to give effect
to recommendations of the relevant committee merely by virtue of the committee's pronouncement in a case.
Although the Maastricht draft does not provide in terms
that the views adopted by the Committee are legally binding,
even on the State Party concerned, it nevertheless moves a
step beyond existing procedures. Article 8 of the draft optional
protocol provides that, where the Committee has found a State
Party has failed to give effect to its obligations under the Convention, it may recommend that the State Party take specific
steps to remedy that failure." 1 The State Party is under an
explicit obligation to take those steps, as well as to inform the
Committee of the steps it has taken. 2
Article 8 envisages that the Committee will possess broad
power to recommend to the State Party whatever measures it
considers appropriate to the particular case before it. As under
the First Optional Protocol, these measures could range from
the payment of damages or the provision of some other form of
reparation, the review or repeal of offending laws, the release
of a person from prison or the adoption of other measures to
ensure that future violations of the Convention will be prevented." 3 The explicit obligation to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee is likely to give some states pause for
thought because of concern about the type of recommendations
the Committee might make, and the extent to which this may
be perceived to impinge inappropriately on the judgment of
national authorities, particularly where complex issues of fact
and policy are concerned. In this respect, the Committee will
need to be somewhat cautious and avoid--except in the clearest cases-specifying in too great detail the exact steps which
states should take to abide by the provisions of the optional
protocol.Y

Fausto Pocar, Legal Value of the Human Rights Committee's Views, 1991-92 CAN.
HUM. RTS. YJB. 119; Mifflerson, supra note 59, at 27-36. However, this argument
appears circular; article 2(3) can be relevant only if there is a binding interpreta-

tion by the Committee pursuant to the Optional Protocol.
261. See infra appendix (for article 8 of the Maastricht draft).
262. A similar provision appears in the Alston draft and the Utrecht draft of
an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See supra note 39 for the Alston and Utrecht drafts.
263. ZWART, supra note 155, at 19-21.
264. Article VEII(2) of the Utrecht Draft Protocol, supra note 39, at 236, which
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13. Follow-Up Power
Experience under the existing procedures suggest that it
would be useful to give the Committee the power to follow up
its decisions." 5 For example, the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR does not explicitly make provision for any action by
the Human Rights Committee after it has adopted its "views"
and communicated them to the State Party and the complainant. As a practical matter, it is sometimes necessary to follow
up decisions, particularly in the case of states which are reluctant or slow to give effect to the views expressed by the Human Rights Committee. Although the Human Rights Committee has sought to follow up on its decisions,266 in the absence
of any formal power to do so it has been rather more tentative
in its actions than it might otherwise have been. 7 The Committee has described the absence of an explicit provision in the
First Optional Protocol on enforcement as "a major shortcoming in 26the
implementation machinery established by the Cove8
nant.)
The record of States Parties in responding to the Human
Rights Committee's invitation to report on action taken in
response to its conclusions appears mixed. 269 This is so even
though in 1991 the Committee's guidelines for the preparation
of periodic reports were amended to add:
When a State Party to the Covenant is also a party to the
Optional Protocol, and if in the period under review in the
Report the Committee has issued views finding that the State
Party has violated provisions of the Covenant, the report
diverges from article 8 of the Maastricht and Alston drafts in this respect, provides that the State Party "shall give due regard to any suggestions or recommendations made by the Committee," rather than obliging the State Party to implement them ("shall implement"). See also Rimmer, supra note 38, §§ 32-33, who
proposes requiring States Parties to use their "best efforts" to remedy any viola-

tions, giving "due consideration to the Committee's recommendations."
265. Markus G. Schmidt, Individual Human Rights Complaints Procedures

Based on United Nations Treaties and the Need for Reform, 41 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
645, 649-51 (1992).
266. NOWAK, supra note 73, at 711-12.
267. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 49, a% 4.41-.43.
268. Follow-Up on Views Adopted Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., Agenda
Item 12(c), a 2, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157ITBB/3 (1993), reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM.
RTS. REP. 345, 345 (1994).
269. Id. %% 3, 10.
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should include a section explaining what action has been
taken relating to the communication concerned. In particular,
the State Party should indicate what remedy it has afforded
the author of the communication whose rights the Committee
found to have been violated.7
The Committee also designated one of its members as a Special Rapporteur for the Follow-Up of Views."
Given the experience of the Human Rights Committee, an
7
Draft
explicit power to follow up decisions seems desirable."
article 9 explicitly provides for such a procedure. 3 It requires that a state take all steps necessary to remedy any
violation of the Convention found by CEDAW and report to it
within three months of the steps it has taken to remedy that
violation. Article 9(1) empowers the Committee to request that
the State Party appear before it to discuss the steps taken and
to continue any discussions with the State Party until the
Committee is satisfied that the steps are adequate. This procedure is similar to that adopted by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association.
14. Procedural Obligations of States Parties with Respect to
Complaints Under the Optional Protocol
Draft article 2(2) obliges States Parties to the Protocol not
to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of communication and also obliges states to take all steps necessary
to prevent any other person from interfering with or
victimizing any person for exercising this right of communication. ' 4 Moreover, States Parties must assist the Committee
in its examination of communications lodged under the Optional Protocol. This provision sets out in more detail the duty of
cooperation which appears in other instruments and also adds

270. See paragraph 15 of U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/5/Rev.1 (1991), which is now contained in paragraph 17 of the revised guidelines of the Committee. Report of the
Human Rights Committee: Revised Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of
Reports from States Parties, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII, at
140, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995) [hereinafter Revised Guidelines].
271. Revised Guidelines, supra note 270,
3. On the experience of the Committee to date, see further id. %%544-65.
272. Contra Rimniner, supra note 38, § 34.
273. See infra appendix (for article 9 of the Maastricht draft).
274. See infra appendix (for article 2(2) of the Maastricht Draft).
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a specific duty to protect a complainant against victimization,
275
not just by the state itself, but also by private individuals.
B. Inquiry by the Committee on its own Motion (PartII of the
Draft Optional Protocol)
The second procedure included in the Maastricht draft
optional protocol empowers the Committee to embark on an
investigation into a situation in a State Party to the Convention if it has received reliable information that indicates systematic or serious violations of the Convention within the
State Party. The justification for a procedure of this type has
already been discussed, both in principle and as a supplement
to an individual complaints procedure.
The model for the procedure included in the draft protocol
is article 20 of the Torture Convention, which draws on other
models such as the Resolution 1503 procedure and ILO inquiry
procedures. Article 20 of the Torture Convention provides the
Committee against Torture with the power to initiate a confidential examination of the situation in a country where "the
Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to

contain well-founded indications that torture is being system-

275. See also infra appendix for article 14 of Maastricht draft which sets out
an obligation to make known the provisions of the protocol and the Committee's
work under it. Compare Chapter IV, article 2(f) of the Draft Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Organs and Groups of Society to Promote
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
which guarantees "[ujnhindered access to and communication with international
bodies with general or special competence to receive and consider communications
on matters of human rights in accordance with applicable international instruments and procedures." Drafting of a Declaration on the Right and Responsibility
of Individuals, Organs and Groups of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Report of the Working
Group on its Tenth Session, Comn'n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Agenda Item 23, at
46, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1995/93 (1995). Article 3(a) of Chapter IV obliges states to
"[take all necessary steps to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of
everyone . . . against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse
discrimination or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of their legitimate
exercise of the rights" referred to in the Declaration. Id. Other international and
regional bodies have also taken steps to provide protection for those participating
in their proceedings. See Co-operation with Representatives of United Nations Human Rights Bodies: Note by the Secretary General, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 47th
Sess., Agenda Item 11, 9 21-23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41991/24 (1991) (steps taken by
ILO in relation to Commission of Inquiry under article 26 of the ILO Constitution,
as well as procedures adopted in relation to proceedings under the European and
American Conventions on Human Rights).
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atically practised in the territory of a State Party." '6 The examination is intended to proceed with the cooperation of the
State Party, but the Committee against Torture may proceed
in the absence of that cooperation. While the examination is
confidential, the Committee against Torture may publish a
summary report of its findings once the inquiry is completed.
The procedure proposed in Part II of the draft follows a
similar sequence. The sources of material on which the Committee might base a conclusion that the threshold for an inquiry had been reached could include-but would not be limited
to-material provided by a State Party, specialized agencies,
NGOs, or reports of United Nations bodies or functionaries.
An important issue is the threshold that should be applied
before the Committee can initiate the procedure. As the procedure is intended to address systematic violations of the Convention, generally something more than a complaint about an
individual case would be required, although such a complaint
might in certain circumstances show the existence of a pattern.2 7 The jurisdictional standard proposed for initiating the
procedure is that there be "reliable information which appears
to [the Committee] to indicate that there is a serious or systematic violation by a State Party of rights set forth in the
Convention, or a serious or systematic failure by a State Party
to give effect to its obligations under the Convention."2 " This
formulation, while fairly general, gives the Committee the opportunity
to interpret the standard in the context of specific
9
cases.

27

One objection to the in ]_
procedure may be that it is
little different from the prE
communications procedure of
the Commission on the Status of Women and that the role of

276. Torture Convention, supra note 49, art. 20, at 199.
277. It may turn out that particular cases (e.g., sati or stoning) would qualify
to initiate the inquiry procedure, since individual cases may indicate the existence
or likelihood of a pattern of violations. The purpose of the procedure is at least in
part preventive and the jurisdictional criterion should be interpreted so as to advance this function where feasible.
278. See infra appendix (for article 11(1) of the Maastricht draft).
279. Some guidance may be obtained from the formulation contained in the
UNESCO Decision, which refers to violations, "resulting either from a policy contrary to human rights, applied de jure or de facto by a State, or from an accumulation of individual cases forming a consistent pattern ...
UNESCO
W."
Decision,
supra note 66, a[ 10(b).
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responding to systematic violations of the human rights of
women is best left to the Commission. However, the
Commission's communications procedure has failed to provide
an avenue for responding to allegations of serious violations of
women's rights, and this appears unlikely to change in the
near future. Designed as a petition procedure to provide the
Commission with information to assist in policy formulation,
the Commission's procedure has produced relatively little in
that respect, and does not provide an effective forum for focusing on serious violations in individual countries. Furthermore,
the scrutiny of communications under the Commission's procedure is carried out by government representatives rather than
by independent experts. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a
government which is the subject of a communication from
serving as a member of the working group of the Commission
which considers the communication. Practice has shown the
importance of independent experts to objective and non-selective monitoring of human rights.
The inquiry procedure proposed may carry with it significant resource implications if the Committee were to initiate
any number of investigations. It might also expose the Committee to charges of selectivity and political bias, although this
may also be the case where individual communications are
being considered. Nevertheless, in our view, this procedure
could provide a useful supplement to an effective complaints
procedure if judiciously employed.
The Maastricht draft also contains a number of adjectival
or procedural provisions which do not appear in other equivalent instruments, although they may have subsequently been
adopted in rules of procedure or as part of the practice of other
treaty bodies. One important featureo0 is an explicit obligation contained in draft article 14 which provides that States
Parties undertake to make widely known, by appropriate and
active means, the contents of the protocol, the procedures it
establishes, any views and recommendations adopted by the
Committee under Part I, and the results of any inquiry conducted under Part II."

280. A somewhat similar provision appears in article 42 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
182, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
281. The Utrecht Draft Protocol contains a similar provision, modelled on arti-
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Many matters relating to the manner in which the Committee should carry out its functions under the optional protocol are probably best left to regulation by the rules of procedure to be adopted by the Committee under the optional protocol. Accordingly, article 15 of the draft specifically empowers
the Committee to make rules of procedure (the power applies
to both the procedures contained in the draft protocol). 2 In
addition to the general power to make rules conferred by article 15(1), article 15(2) specifies a number of specific matters on
which the Committee may make rules. The purpose of mentioning these matters in the protocol itself is to make clear
that the Committee does have power to take particular actions,
such as adopting an urgent action procedure or regulating its
fact-finding procedure and thus to avoid unproductive discussion of ultra vires considerations. While other bodies have
made rules of procedure with respect to important procedural
matters not expressly mentioned in their enabling instruments
(presumably on the basis of an implied power to do so), clarifying the issue at the outset seems preferable. Article 19(1) of
the Convention already provides a power for the Committee to
make rules of procedure, but a specific power relating to the
protocol nevertheless seems advisable."s
C. Submission to Both Procedures
The inclusion of more than one procedure in the draft
optional protocol gives rise to the question of whether a state
wishing to become a party to the protocol will be obliged to
submit to both procedures and, if not, whether one of the procedures should be compulsory. Insofar as a protocol along the
lines of the Maastricht draft is concerned, three options are
available. First, a state must accept both procedures if it wishes to become a party to the optional protocol; second, a state
could submit to only one of the procedures and could choose
which of the two procedures it wished to accept; or third, a
state would be required to accept one of the procedures to be
specified in the protocol and would have an option as to wheth-

cles 2(2) and 14 of the Maastricht Draft. Utrecht Draft Protocol, supra note 39,
art. 11(2), at 234; see van Hoof, supra note 74, at 163-64.
282. See infra appendix (for article 15 of the Maastricht draft).
283. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 19(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 22.

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXI:3

er it submitted to the other.
The Maastricht draft proposes that a state wishing to
become a party to the protocol must accept both the individual
complaints procedure and the inquiry procedure. This approach
was taken despite the fact that the draft before the Maastricht
meeting suggested that of the three procedures it proposed
(individual, inquiry, and interstate), only the individual complaints procedure would be compulsory. However, the draft
provided that, if states did not want to be bound by the inquiry
procedure, they would have to opt out. Some concern was expressed at the Maastricht meeting that states might be less
willing to become parties to a protocol which included both a
compulsory complaints procedure and an inquiry procedure
rather than one which made the latter procedure optional.
Ultimately, however, the view prevailed that states would not
be deterred from accepting the protocol by the requirement
that they submit to both procedures.
Nevertheless, states have shown themselves less willing to
submit to the inquiry procedure under the Torture Convention
than they are to accept the individual complaints procedure
provided for under article 22 of that Convention. 4 Experience with the Torture Convention suggests that providing
states with the choice of opting out of an inquiry procedure
may lead to a larger number of states accepting the individual
complaints procedure.' States may well be concerned about
284. Torture Convention, supra note 49, art. 22, at 200.
285. Under the Torture Convention, states becoming parties to the Convention
may submit to an individual communication procedure, an interstate communications procedure, and to the investigative procedure established under article 20 of
the Convention. Id. at 199. States must expressly declare that they accept the
first two procedures in order to be bound by them, while states are considered to
be bound by the article 20 procedure unless they expressly opt out of the procedure. The number of states bound by the article 20 procedure is much larger than
the number which has accepted either the individual complaints procedure or the
interstate procedure. As of January 1, 1996, of 107 States Parties, 101 had submitted to the article 20 procedure, 38 had submitted to the article 21 interstate
procedure, and 36 had submitted to the article 22 individual complaint procedure.
See List of States Which have Signed, Ratified, or Acceded to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment,
U.N. Doe. EICN.4/1996/34 (1996); Facsimile Transmission from Alessio Bruni, Secretary of the Committee against Torture, in Geneva, Switzerland (Jan. 18, 1996)
(on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); see also Byrnes, supra
note 72, at 530.
The draft before the Maastricht meeting, which proposed all three procedures, suggested that the individual complaints procedure should be compulsory,
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the breadth of the Committee's jurisdiction under Part II of the
Maastricht draft and wary about submitting to this jurisdiction. Accordingly, the draft may prove to be optimistic on this
score, with the most likely outcome being elimination of the
inquiry procedure entirely or the addition of a clause providing
states with the option of not submitting to the inquiry procedure on an opt in or opt out basis. In any event, an individual
complaints procedure is an indispensable part of an effective
complaints mechanism and any protocol should therefore require that a state wishing to become party to such a protocol
accept the individual complaints procedure.
D. Institutional Implications of the Adoption of a Petition
Procedure Under the Convention
1. Overlapping/Duplicative Procedures
Concerns are likely to be expressed that the adoption of a
petition procedure under the Women's Convention would lead
to a large measure of substantive overlap with existing communications mechanisms, giving rise to inefficient and unnecessary duplication, administrative inconvenience, and possibly
normative conflict. The procedures with which a communication procedure under the Convention may overlap include:
1) so far as an individual complaint procedure is concerned,
individual complaints procedures with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex that exist under the Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR, as well as relevant regional procedures; and
2) so far as an inquiry procedure is concerned, the procedure
under Resolution 1503, the communications procedure of the
Commission on the Status of Women, as well as some of the
thematic mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights,
in particular the recently established Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women.
It should be noted that the possibility of overlaps between
existing procedures and proposed procedures has existed in
other contexts. In general, however, this has not led to a decision not to adopt a new complaints procedure. For example,

and that states should be required to opt out of the other two if they did not
want to be bound by them.
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although the Torture Convention contains substantive guarantees which are also covered by the ICCPR, this was considered an insufficient reason for not adopting an individual complaint procedure under the Torture Convention. Nor was the
fact that other petition procedures such as the Resolution 1503
procedure covered torture, considered a reason for not adopting
the inquiry procedure contained in article 20 of the Torture
Convention.
There is some substantive overlap between the guarantees
of the Convention and the non-discrimination guarantees of
the ICCPR, especially articles 2, 3 and 26 of the ICCPR. However, although many States Parties to the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol are also States Parties to the Women's Convention, there are countries which are parties to the Convention but not the ICCPR and vice versa. The only overlap of real
concern would exist in relation to a State Party to both conventions which has also accepted the competence of the Human
Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol and of CEDAW
under an optional protocol to the Women's Convention. In
cases such as this, the important issues are to which procedure
a complaint should be routed and on what basis,"6 and
whether a complaint which has been brought under one procedure may subsequently or simultaneously be brought under
the other procedure. 7
So far as the adoption of an inquiry procedure under the
Optional Protocol is concerned, the only real problem with
overlap and inefficient duplication might be the mandate of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. This mandate
authorizes the Special Rapporteur to seek and receive information on violence against women, its causes and consequences
from governments to employ U.N. human rights mechanisms
and other intergovernmental organizations, as well as NGOs,
to recommend measures aimed at all levels to eliminate violence against women and its causes and to remedy its consequences, and to work closely with other bodies within the U.N.
system so that human rights violations against women are
regularly and systematically included in their reports and
deliberations.' That overlap would, of course, only occur
286. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
288. See C.IIR. Res. 1994/45, supra note 24.
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with respect to those members of the United Nations which
had ratified the Women's Convention and accepted one or both
of its complaint procedures. Moreover, the overlap would only
exist in relation to communications concerning violence against
women. In addition, the nature of the functions of the Committee and the Special Rapporteur are quite different. The Special
Rapporteur does not engage in investigation or any form of
"adjudication" of complaints or allegations as would the Committee.
A similar situation arose under the Torture Convention
following the appointment by the Human Rights Commission
of its Special Rapporteur on Torture whose mandate overlaps
substantively with that of the Committee against Torture far
more than that of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women overlaps with that of CEDAW. Despite some concern
about overlap, the Special Rapporteur and the Committee have
somewhat different and have been able to work constructively
together without inefficient duplicationY 9 A similar modus
vivendi can presumably be worked out between the Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, whose substantive
remit is narrower than the scope of the Convention, and
CEDAW, and the apparent overlap should not stand in the
way of adopting an optional protocol to the Convention.
2. Normative Conflicts
One consequence of having procedures which empower two
or more different bodies to consider communications under
their respective treaties is that each body may adopt different
interpretations of similarly or identically worded guarantees.
This possibility of conflicting or divergent interpretations already exists in the context of the general comments and gener"alrecommendations adopted by the various treaty bodies, as
well as between the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, and the adoption of an optional protocol to the Women's Convention will inevitably contribute to
this possibility. To date, although there have been differences
of interpretation by the various treaty bodies, there have been
no major conflicts of interpretation and it may well be that,

289. See Byrnes, supra note 72, at 542-46; Rodley, supra note 2, ga 44-51.
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were a protocol to the Women's Convention to be adopted,
normative conflict would be only a remote danger."' On the
other hand, Philip Alston has observed that "[iun the longer
term, it seems inevitable that instances of normative inconsistency will multiply and that significant problems will result."29 Likewise, in his commentary on the Maastricht draft,
Ben Rimmer argues that normative inconsistency, which he believes can only bring the U.N. human rights system into disrepute, is a real risk attendant on the adoption of a complaints
procedure to the Women's Convention. Indeed, he believes that
the risk of differential interpretation of identical or similar
obligations between the Committee and the Human Rights
Committee is greater than that which currently exists between
the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against
Torture because differences of approach are inevitable, with
CEDAW Committee members, in principle, committed to the
elimination of discrimination against women on the basis of
sex, whereas a wide variety of beliefs may exist within the
Human Rights Committee.292
The danger of normative inconsistency is not, however, a
problem which will arise only as a result of the adoption of a
complaints mechanism to the Women's Convention. Indeed, it
is a problem which already exists within the human rights
system. Resolution of this problem does not lie in the rejection
of new proposals such as the proposed optional protocol, but
rather in institutional and other reforms. Ensuring that all
committees are aware of the normative developments in other
committees is likely to be one effective way of limiting conflicting and divergent interpretations. This should ensure that the
interpretations of each body are considered to be of equal validity. The effect of not adopting a complaints procedure under
the Convention, in an effort to avoid possible normative inconsistency, would privilege further the dominant interpretive
position of bodies which presently have complaints procedures.

290. Cf Tardu, supra note 152,
74-75.
291. Philip Alston, Study on Possible Long-Term Approaches to the Supervision
of New Instruments on Human Rights,
128, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (1989). See also
Rick Lawson, Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the European
Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, in 3 THE DYNAMtICS
OF THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 83, at 219.
292. Rimmer, supra note 38, § 12.

1996]

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

779

These have been criticized for paying insufficient attention to
gender issues and adopting androcentric interpretations. If the
assumption that CEDAW would adopt different interpretations
is correct, this may have the beneficial effect of redressing
limitations in existing human rights jurisprudence.
E. The Need for Additional Resources for CEDAW
The adoption of an optional protocol to the Convention
would necessarily mean that CEDAW would require more
meeting time to carry out its additional functions. At present,
article 20 of the Convention provides that CEDAW shall "normally" meet for a period of two weeks annually." 3 As more
states have become parties to the Convention and the number
of reports to be reviewed has grown, the Committee has experienced difficulties in getting through the amount of work required in order to avoid falling behind in its consideration of
reports. In recent years, the Committee has been granted an
additional week's meeting time in order to help reduce its
but this still has not been sufficient to accomplish that
backlog,
29 4
goal.
Thus, there is no time in CEDAW's present schedule for
the consideration of communications under the proposed optional protocol. Additional time, funds, and resources would
need to be made available to the Committee. It is difficult to
estimate the extent of the additional resources that would be
required because it would depend on the number of
ratifications, the number and complexity of complaints, and
the procedures adopted by the Committee for the consideration
of those complaints. However, it would probably require at the
outset at least a week of additional plenary meeting time and
the establishment of a pre- or -inter-sessional working group,
in addition to the work that would need to be performed between the once yearly sessions.
While comparisons with the work of other bodies may not
permit a reliable prediction to be made of the impact of a pro-

293. Women's Convention, supra note 3, art. 20, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 22.

294. The States Parties to the Convention have refused to amend article 22 of
the Convention in order to provide that the Committee should have such time as
is necessary for its meetings, preferring to require the Committee to apply on an
ad hoc basis to the States Parties for additional meeting time. Report of the
Eighth Meeting of the States Parties, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/1995/2 (1995).
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tocol on CEDAW's workload, it may be noted that the Committee against Torture spent a total of 42 meetings over its first
14 sessions on its work under article 20 of the Convention
which commenced at its fourth session.2

5

During its thir-

teenth and fourteenth sessions, the Committee had before it 13
individual communications. However, the Human Rights Committee has received over 600 individual communications since
1976 when the First Optional Protocol entered into force,296
while CERD has received only a handful since the entry into
force of article 14 of the Racial Discrimination Convention in
1982.297 Article 16 of the Maastricht draft seeks to address
this matter by making clear the Committee's need for additional time if the protocol is adoptedY The article provides that
the Committee will meet for such period, being not less than
three weeks annually, as is necessary to carry out its functions
under the protocol.
Additional secretariat staff would also be needed once the
optional protocol was operational in order to provide support
for the Committee's activities. In this context, expert legal
assistance would be required. There would be an increased
need for inter-sessional support for members of the Committee
entrusted with tasks between sessions of the Committee. Article 16 of the Maastricht draft stakes a claim for the additional
support, which would have to come from the normal budget of
the United Nations, by providing that the Secretary-General of
the United Nations is to provide the Committee with the necessary staff and facilities for the performance of its functions
under the protocol.
A related question is that of the expertise of the Committee and the legal and other support with which it is provided.
While Committee members have qualifications in a range of
disciplines-a factor which will no doubt assist in their evaluation of many aspects of complaints-it seems likely that there
will be a great deal of technical legal work required in dealing
295. Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOI, 50th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, 9 186, U.N. Doc. A150/44 (1995).
296. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No.
40, Vol. I, 91484, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995) (636 communications registered as of
July 1995).
297. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,U.N.
GAOl?, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 9191
673-74, U.N. Doc. A/50/18 (1995).
298. See infra appendix (for article 16 of the Maastricht draft).
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with complaints under any protocol. At present, the secretariat
servicing the Committee is not in a position to provide assistance of this sort on the scale required, and this would need to
be remedied in one way or another were an optional protocol
adoptedY9 Article 16(2) of the Maastricht draft makes clear
the need for such assistance and would require the SecretaryGeneral to ensure that it is provided.
The addition of another procedure to deal with communications submitted to the United Nations raises the question of
which body a communication should be routed to when there
are a number of bodies which have jurisdiction. In many cases
there may not be such a choice because the communication
may concern a subject matter covered only by one treaty, or
the State Party concerned may be a party to only one relevant
procedure. However, in the case of the Women's Convention,
there may be considerable overlap with other treaties, in particular the ICCPR.
This problem has arisen already within the United Nations. There are no formal guidelines for the routing of such
communications and, if the author of the communication does
not express a preference, then the secretariat routes the complaint to what it, on the basis of an informal preliminary evaluation °° taking into account the gravamen of the complaint,
considers the most appropriate forum. For example, the secretariat may route complaints of torture to the Committee
against Torture, or complaints of discrimination on the basis of
national origin to CERD, if those avenues are available.
The author of a complaint would no doubt prefer to select
the forum which offers the best chance for a successful outcome. This may be of more importance if divergent interpretations of similar guarantees develop among the different treaty
bodies. For example, if a complaint were based on the failure
of the State Party to enact legislation adequately protecting a
person against discrimination by private persons, the complaint might be considered under either the ICCPR or the
Convention. The obligations under the Convention with respect

299. There are presently proposals to shift the Committee's secretariat servicing
to the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. While this would make available to
the Committee the required legal expertise in human rights matters, the Centre is
itself severely understaffed.
300. See generally Schmidt, supra note 265, at 653-54.
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to legislating against discrimination by private parties are
more clearly stated than are applicable obligations under the
ICCPR. Indeed, the scope of the obligations may well be broader than the obligations under the ICCPR. In such a case, it
may be preferable for the complaint to be routed to CEDAW.
It would be possible to provide in the optional protocol that
States Parties agree that complaints which fall within the
protocol should be considered under it rather than under any
other procedure. However, it seems preferable to leave this to
be worked out by liaison between the various treaty bodies
rather than by trying to deal with it by a rigid rule which
might not in every case ensure that the complaint went to the
most appropriate body.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision whether or not to adopt an optional protocol
to the Women's Convention, the content of any such instrument, and the scale of resources committed to implementing it,
constitutes a litmus test for the depth of the international
community's commitment to the effective realization of the
human rights of women. While the proposed protocol gives rise
to some legitimate legal and institutional concerns, we maintain that they can be allayed and should not stand in the way
of the adoption of a protocol along the lines of the Maastricht
draft. It is also likely that some of these objections will be put
forward, not so much because of a deep concern about the
issues they raise, but as a means of expressing a deeper opposition to measures which have the potential to strengthen the
international mechanisms for enforcing the human rights of
women.
Perhaps the most obvious point to stress is that provisions
which give rise to similar legal concerns about justiciability are
already subject to complaint procedures under U.N. human
rights treaties and other U.N. instruments, as well as under
regional and national human rights instruments. Similarly,
many of the institutional concerns about overlapping
competencies, the possibility of normative conflicts, and related
issues have arisen in contexts other than the enforcement of
the human rights of women, and have not been found to be
insuperable obstacles in those contexts. To maintain that they
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are so in relation to women's human rights would be unfortunate and would smack of the second-grade treatment that
issues of women's human rights have received within the U.N.
system in a number of respects. The adoption of a protocol to
the Convention along the lines of the Maastricht draft would
not merely reenact what already exists, but we should remember that advances in human rights thinking have always come
about as the result of a willingness to innovate and be imaginative, on the solid base of what has gone before.
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Appendix

DRAFT OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN

adopted by
THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON THE ADOPTION OF
AN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN

organised by the
Women in the Law Project
International Human Rights Law Group
and the
Maastricht Centre for Human Rights

University of Limburg
Maastricht, Netherlands
29 September - 1 October 1994
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DRAFT OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

The States Partiesto this Protocol,

Recognizing the desirability of creating a global environment in which the human rights of women will be realized,
and the responsibility which all States share to achieve this
goal,

Recalling that the Vienna Declaration and Programme
for Action urged that the full and equal enjoyment by women
of all human rights be a priority for governments and for the
United Nations,

Recognizing further that serious violations of the human rights of women remain pervasive in all societies and
cultures,

Recognizing further the importance of ensuring that
women are aware of their rights under national and international law and the importance of overcoming the obstacles
which impede their effective access to judicial procedures and
other remedies,

Emphasizing the important role of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in elaborating the scope and content of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,

Convinced of the importance of ensuring that women
have access to effective international procedures for the en-
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forcement of the rights and obligations set forth in the Convention,
Convinced that, in order further to achieve the purposes of the Convention, the Committee should have power to
receive and examine communications, and the power to conduct inquiries where there are allegations of serious or systematic violations of rights set forth in the Convention or of a
serious or systematic failure by a State Party to give effect to
its obligations under the Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
PART I
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE
Article 1
1. A State Party to the Convention that becomes a Party
to this Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to
receive and examine communications submitted in accordance
with the provisions of this Protocol.
2. No communication shall be received by the Committee
if it concerns a State Party to the Convention which is not a
Part to this Protocol.
Article 2
1.

An individual, group or organization:

(a)
claiming to have suffered detriment as a result of
a violation of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention,
or claiming to be directly affected by the failure on the part of
a State Party to this Protocol to give effect to its obligations
under the Convention; or
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claiming that a State Party has violated any of
(b)
the rights set forth in the Convention or has failed to give
effect to any of its obligations under the Convention with respect to a person or group of persons other than the author,
and having in the opinion of the Committee a sufficient interest in the matter,
may submit a written communication to the Committee for its
examination.
2. States Parties to this Protocol undertake not to hinder
in any way the effective exercise of this right of communication
and to take all steps necessary to prevent any person, group,
organization or authority from interfering with the exercise of
this right of communication or victimizing any person for exercising such right, and to assist the Committee in its examination of communications lodged under this Part.

Article 3
1. No communication shall be received by the Committee
if it is anonymous.
2. The Committee shall declare a communication inadmissible if it:
does not contain allegations which, if substantiat(a)
ed, would constitute a violation of rights guaranteed by the
Convention or a failure by a State Party to give effect to its
obligations under the Convention;
relates to acts and omissions which occurred be(b)
fore the entry into force of this Protocol for the State Party
concerned, unless those acts or omissionsconstitute a continuing violation of the Con(i)
vention or a continuing failure to give effect to the State's
obligations under the Convention; or
have effects which continue beyond the entry
(ii)
into force of this Protocol and those effects themselves consti-
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tute a violation of a right set forth in the Convention or a failure by the State Party concerned to give effect to its obligations under the Convention; or
(c)
tion.

is an abuse of the right to submit a communica-

3. The Committee shall not declare a communication
admissible unless it has ascertained:
(a)
that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted, unless the Committee considers that the application
of this requirement would be unreasonable; and
(b)
that a communication submitted by or on behalf of
the author which raises essentially the same issues of fact and
law is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The Committee may, however, examine such a communication where the procedure of
international investigation or settlement is unreasonably prolonged.
Article 4
1. The Committee may decline to continue to examine a
communication if the author, after being given a reasonable
opportunity to do so, fails to provide information which would
sufficiently substantiate the allegations contained in the communication.
2. The Committee may recommence examination of a
communication which it has declared inadmissible under article 3 if the circumstances which led to its decision have
changed.
Article 5
1. At any time after the receipt of a communication, the
Committee may request the State Party concerned to take such
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interim measures as may be necessary to preserve the status
quo or to avoid irreparable harm.
2. The State Party concerned shall take all necessary
steps to comply with a request made by the Committee under
paragraph 1.
3. Where the Committee exercises its power under para.
graph 1, it shall inform the State Party concerned that its
request does not imply a determination of the merits of the
communication.

Article 6
1. Unless the Committee considers that a communication
should be declared inadmissible without reference to the State
Party concerned, the Committee shall confidentially bring any
communication referred to it under this Protocol to the attention of the State Party concerned, but the identity of the author shall not be revealed without her or their express consent.
2. Within three months, the receiving State shall submit
to the Committee explanations or statements and the remedy,
if any, that may have been afforded by that State.
3. During its examination of a communication, the Committee shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned
with a view to facilitating settlement of the matter on the
basis of respect for the rights and obligations set forth in the
Convention.

Article 7
1. The Committee shall consider communications received under this Protocol in the light of all information made
available to it by or on behalf of the author and by the State
Party concerned. The Committee may also take into account
information obtained from other sources, provided that this
information is transmitted to the author and State Party for
comment.
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2. The Committee may adopt such procedures as will
enable it to ascertain the facts and to assess the extent to
which the State Party concerned has fulfilled its obligations
under the Convention.
3. As part of its examination of a communication, the
Committee may, with the agreement of the State Party concerned, visit the territory of that State Party.
4. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this Part.
5. After examining a communication, the Committee
shall adopt its views on the claims made in the communication
and shall transmit these to the State Party and to the author,
together with any recommendations it considers appropriate.

Article 8
1. Where the Committee is of the view that a State Party
has failed to give effect to its obligations under the Convention,
the Committee may recommend that the State Party take specific measures to remedy any violation or failure by the State
to give effect to its obligations under the Convention and to
prevent a recurrence of any such violation or failure.
2. The State Party shall take all steps necessary to remedy any violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or
failure to fulfil its obligations under the Convention. The State
Party shall implement any recommendations made by the
Committee, and shall ensure that adequate reparation or other
appropriate remedy is provided.
3. The State Party concerned shall, within three months
of receiving notice of the decision of the Committee under
paragraph 1, or such longer period as may be specified by the
Committee, provide the Committee with details of the measures which it has taken in accordance with paragraph 2.
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Article 9
1. The Committee may at any time invite a State Party
to discuss with it the measures which the State Party has
taken to give effect to the views or recommendations of the
Committee. The Committee may continue discussions with the
State Party concerned until the Committee is satisfied that
appropriate steps have been taken to remedy any failure by
the State Party to give effect to its obligations under the Convention.
2. The Committee may invite the State Party concerned
to include in its reports under Article 18 of the Convention
details of any measures taken in response to the Committee's
views and recommendations.
3. The Committee shall include in its annual report an
account of the substance of the communication and its examination of the matter, a summary of the explanations and statements of the State Party concerned, of its own views and recommendations, and the response of the State Party concerned
to those views and recommendations.
Article 10
The Committee may delegate to one or more members of
the Committee any of the powers conferred on it by this Part,
other than the powers contained in articles 7(5) and 8(1) to
adopt views and recommendations.

PART II
INQUIRY PROCEDURE
Article 11
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which
appears to it to indicate that there is a serious or systematic
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violation by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention,
or a serious or systematic failure by a State Party to give effect
to its obligations under the Convention, the Committee shall
invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the
information and to submit observations with regard to the
information concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which may have
been submitted by the State Party concerned, as well as any
other relevant information available to it, the Committee may,
if it decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its
members to conduct an inquiry and to report urgently to the
Committee.
3. If an inquiry is conducted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall seek the cooperation of the State Party concerned. Such an inquiry may, with
the agreement of the State Party, include a visit to its territory.
4.(a)
After examining the findings of its member or
members submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this
article, the Committee shall transmit these findings, together
with any comments and recommendations, to the State Party
concerned.
(b)
The State Party shall, within three months of
receiving the findings, comments and recommendations transmitted by the Committee, submit its observations to the Committee.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of this article shall be confidential, and the
cooperation of -the State Party shall be sought at all stages of
the proceedings.
6. After taking into account any observations made by
the State Party, the Committee may publish a report.
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Article 12
1. The Committee may at any time invite a State Party to
discuss with it the steps which the State Party has taken in
response to a report adopted by the Committee under article
11. The Committee may continue such discussions with the
State Party concerned until the Committee is satisfied that
appropriate steps have been taken to remedy any violations of
rights set forth in the Convention or any failure by the State
Party to give effect to its obligations under the Convention.
2. The Committee may invite the State Party concerned
to include in its reports under Article 18 of the Convention
details of any measures taken in response to a report adopted
by the Committee under Article 11.

Article 13
States Parties to this Protocol undertake to assist the
Committee in its inquiries under this Part and to take all steps
necessary to prevent any person, group, authority or organization from interfering with or victimizing any person providing
information to or assisting the Committee in its inquiries under this Part.

PART III
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 14
States parties undertake to make widely known, by appropriate and active means:
(a)
the contents of this Protocol and the procedures
established under it;
(b)
any views and recommendations adopted by the
Committee under Part I; and
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(c)
the report of the results of any inquiry conducted
under Part II.

Article 15
1. The Committee may make rules of procedure prescribing the procedure to be followed when it is exercising the functions conferred on it by this Protocol.
2. Without limiting the generality of the power conferred
by paragraph 1, the Committee may make rules of procedure
with respect to:
(a)
the measures which may be taken by or on behalf
of the Committee in any matter of urgency;
the gathering of information which the Committee
(b)
may take into account when carrying out its functions under
this Protocol;
(c)
the procedures which the Committee may adopt
when examining a communication under Part I or conducting
an inquiry under Part II. These may include the taking of evidence in written or oral form; and
the dissemination by States Parties of views and
(d)
recommendations adopted by the Committee under Part I and
reports of the results of any inquiry conducted under Part II.

Article 16
1. The Committee shall meet for such period, being not
less than three weeks annually, as is necessary to carry out its
functions under this Protocol.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
provide the Committee with the necessary staff and facilities
for the performance of its functions under this Protocol, and in
particular shall ensure that expert legal advice is available to
the Committee for this purpose.
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Article 17
1. This Protocol is open for signature by any State which
has signed the Convention.
2. This Protocol is subject to ratification by any State
which has ratified or acceded to the Convention. Instruments
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
3. This Protocol shall be open to accession by any State
which has ratified or acceded to the Convention.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States which have signed this Protocol or acceded to
it of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 18
1. This Protocol shall enter into force three months after
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification or instrument
of accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Protocol or acceding to it
after its entry into force, this Protocol shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 19
1. This Protocol will be binding upon each State Party in
respect of all territories subject to its jurisdiction.
2. The provisions of this Protocol shall extend to all parts
of federal States without any limitations or exceptions.
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Article 20
No reservations to this Protocol shall be permitted.
Article 21
1. Any State Party to this Protocol may propose an
amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to this
Protocol with the request that they notify him or her whether
they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of
considering and voting upon the proposal. If within four
months from the date of such communication at least one third
of the States Parties favours such a conference, the SecretaryGeneral shall convene such a conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by majority of
the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall
be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations
for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have
been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations
and accepted by a two thirds majority of the States Parties to
this Protocol in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
3. When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other
States Parties still being bound by the provisions of this Protocol and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.

Article 22
1. Any State Party may denounce this Protocol at any
time by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year
after the date of receipt of the notification by the SecretaryGeneral.
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2. Denunciations shall be without prejudice to the continued application of the provisions of this Protocol to any
communication submitted under Part I or inquiry commenced
under Part II before the effective date of denunciation.
3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a
State Party becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration of any new matter regarding that State.

Article 23
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States referred to in article 25 of the Convention of:
(a)
Protocol;

signatures, ratifications and accessions under this

(b)
the date of entry into force of this Protocol and
the date of entry into force of any amendment under article 21;
and
(c)

denunciations under article 22.

Article 24
1. This Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
transmit certified copies of this Protocol to all States referred
to in article 25 of the Convention.

